BMP5

Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea

SAUDI ARABIA

OMAN

INDIA

ERITREA

YEMEN

DJIBOUTI

SOMALIA

ETHIOPIA

KENYA

TANZANIA

Produced and supported by:

BIMCO

CDI

CLIA

International Chamber of Shipping
Shaping the Future of Shipping

UNITY FOR SAFETY AT SEA
IFSMA

IGP&I International Group of P&I Clubs

IMCA

INTERCARGO

InterManager

IMEC

itf

INTERTANKO

IPTA International Parcel Tankers Association

ISWAN

Joint Hull *committee*

Joint War Committee

THE MISSION TO SEAFARERS

OCIMF

Sailors Society

SIGTTO

WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL
PARTNERS IN TRADE

CONTACT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA

EU NAVFOR Somalia

MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE
HORN OF AFRICA

ICC International Maritime Bureau

INFORMATION FUSION CENTRE

INTERPOL

ROYAL NAVY

船舶通过高危风险区最佳管理手册
BMP 5

<div align="right">---华信中安编译</div>

红海、亚丁湾、印度洋和阿拉伯海制止海盗和提高海上安全的最佳管理措施

P3-制止海盗和加强红海、亚丁湾、印度洋和阿拉伯海海上安全的最佳管理做法

P4-法律公告
BMP5 已经发展成为纯粹用于用户自身风险的指导。作者、其成员或任何人、公司、公司或组织对 BMP5 中的任何信息的准确性或 BMP5 的任何遗漏或因直接或间接地施加或依赖于包含的指导而产生的任何后果不承担任何责任。

P5-内容
BMP 的基本要求
第 1 节 介绍
第 2 节 威胁
第 3 节 威胁和风险评估
第 4 节 规划
第 5 节 船舶防护措施
第 6 条 报告
第 7 节 船舶遭受攻击
附件 A 联系方式
附件 B 海上安全图
附件 C 共同谅解
附录 D UKMTO 报告表格
附件 E 海上安全中心-非洲之角报告表格
附件 F 渔业捕捞船舶
附件 G 包括游艇的附加建议

P6- BMP 的基本要求

△了解威胁

海上威胁是动态的。

获取当前威胁信息对于风险评估和决策至关重要。

△进行风险评估

公司必须进行风险评估。

确定船舶防护措施。

△船舶防护措施的实施

使船变硬。

对船员进行简单的培训。

增强警戒

遵循国旗状态和军事指导。

△报告

向 UMMTO 报告并向 MSCHA 注册。

报告突发事件和可疑活动。

遇险时发出遇险信号。

△合作

与其他航运和军事力量合作。

与执法部门合作保存证据。

与福利机构合作。

P7-第 1 节

介绍

在红海、亚丁湾、印度洋和阿拉伯海航行时，海员遭遇了不同的安全威胁。

本出版物的目的是帮助船舶计划航行，探测、避免、阻止、延迟和报告攻击。经验表明，在本出版物中的建议的应用对海员的安全方面有着显著的作用。

海盗特有的最佳管理实践（BMP）、国际海军和岸上能力建设有助于抑制海盗行为。然而，索马里海盗尚未根除，仍然是威胁。

本出版物中包含的 BMP 减轻了海盗和其他海上安全威胁的风险。

区域不稳定引发了其他海上安全威胁，其中包括：

•极端主义组织故意瞄准船只。

•区域冲突引起的附带损害。

BMP 海盗措施是有效的，但攻击方法与其他威胁的差异可能需要其他形式的缓解。例如，极端分子发动的攻击可能会更加坚定，因为他们可能愿意冒生命危险。

不采取有效的安全措施的后果可能很严重。一些海盗劫持人质到暴力和其他虐待，被劫持的海员被囚禁的时间已经持续了几年。其他袭击已经表明意图破坏船只并危及生命。

应咨询英国海上贸易业务（www. ukMto.org）和海事安全中心——非洲之角（www. MSCHA.org）网站。见附件 A 的联系方式。

该 BMP 补充了最新国际海事组织（IMO）MSC 通告（见 www. imo.Org）和关

于海上安全过境通道的建议。

本小册子的任何内容都无法削弱船长保护其船员，船舶和货物的绝对权力。

P8-地理区域

该地区的地理是多样的，范围从狭窄的扼流点，如 Bab el Mandeb（BAM）海峡和霍尔木兹海峡到索马里盆地的广阔海洋。每个区域呈现不同的挑战，威胁将有所不同。

整个区域都发生了对船只和海员的袭击。威胁是动态的，应该从附件 A 列出的组织中寻求信息。

自愿报告区

UKMTO 自愿报告区域（VRA）在诸如 UKHO Q6099 等海上安全图上被识别。船舶进入和运行在 VRA 鼓励注册 UKMTO。登记在报告船舶与 UKMTO 之间建立直接联系。船舶登记区

MSCHA 船舶登记区的设计目的是通知印度洋和亚丁湾的商业反海盗力量。MSCHA 船舶登记区域是在海上安全图 Q6099 上定义的。

高危地区

高风险区域（HRA）是 VRA 内的行业定义区域，认为存在较高的攻击风险，并且可能需要额外的安全要求。HRA 概述在海上安全图 Q6099 上。重要的是，当通过 HRA 规划路线时，使用当前威胁的最新信息。船舶应准备在短时间内偏离其计划航线，以避免航行警告或军事力量所凸显的威胁。

海上安全过境通道

海上安全过境通道（MSTC）是一个军事上建立的走廊，海军力量集中在他们的存在和监视工作上。MSTC 显示在海上安全图 Q6099 上，下图包括：

国际推荐的过境通道（IRTC）。
IRTC 不是一个交通分离方案（TSS），而是一个在亚丁湾建立的过境走廊，海军力量集中在他们的反海盗巡逻。在 IRTC 内，可以提供团体转送和国家车队。
BAM-TSS 和汉斯群岛的 TSS 西部。

建议船只使用 MSTC 从军事存在和监视中获益。

P9-联合战争委员会上市地区

保险界可能列出一个区域内感知到的增强风险的区域。船舶进入该地区将需要通知他们的保险公司和额外的保险费可能适用。联合战争委员会（JWC）包括劳埃德和国际承销协会的承销代表，代表在伦敦市场写海战业务的人的利益。JWC 列出的地区的地理限制可以在他们的网站上找到：
www. LMelyyds.COM/LMA/CouthWar。

P10-第 2 节
威胁

除了海盗，地区不稳定也带来了新的安全威胁，包括：
反舰导弹。
海雷。
水性简易爆炸装置（WBED）。

海上抢劫
海盗在海盗行动团体（PAG）中运作，他们使用几种不同的船型，通常使用小型高速（高达 25 节）的敞篷船或小艇。

PAG 船配置包括：
只有小艇。
打开捕鲸船携带大量燃料并经常拖曳一个或多个攻击小艇。
母舰，包括商船和渔船，但更常见的是大型渔船。

在使用母舰的地方，船员通常被扣押在船上。母舰被用来运送海盗、补给、燃料和快速小艇，以使海盗能够在更大的区域进行操作，并且显著地受到天气的影响。攻击小艇经常被拖在母舰后面。当母舰的大小允许时，小艇便于携带和伪装。海盗可以使用小武器火和火箭推进手榴弹（RPG）来吓唬船长，以降低速度或停止让他们登机。驾驶台和生活区往往是这些武器的主要目标。

海盗们使用长长的轻便梯子、打结的攀登绳索或长钩的杆子爬上船侧。一旦登船，他们将设法到达驾驶台试图控制这艘船。当他们在驾驶台时，他们会要求船只减速/停止，以便其他海盗登船。

攻击可以在任何时间发生——无论白天还是黑夜——然而经验表明，黎明和黄昏的攻击可能性更大。

P11-索马里海盗的意图是劫持船只并扣押船员赎金。通常的做法是让船员在谈判过程中继续工作，使船员和船保持在一起。海员偶尔会被按照被国籍分开并扣押上岸。尽管海盗的恐吓和拷打事件已经发生，但海盗们仍倾向于他们的俘虏活着。

反舰飞弹
反舰导弹是远程、精确和强大的武器，已经被用来对付该地区的军舰。与区域冲突相关的商船不排除会遭到导弹袭击。如果导弹控制器瞄准了错误的舰船或导弹目标，这些无辜船只就会遭到导弹袭击。

海雷
海雷已经被用来阻止进入也门的关键港口。这些海雷通常是系绳或锚固的，但可能脱离系泊而漂流到航道。穿行的商船并不是目标但是建议船只在穿越该区域时使用 MSTC。

水上及时爆炸装置
WBIE 攻击已经被用来对付红海南部/亚丁湾西部地区的军舰和商船。

事件突显了该地区不同集团的攻击：
在区域冲突中恐怖袭击旨在伤害与冲突相关的人。这些船无人驾驶，通过遥控控制。

极端分子使用的 WBIED 是针对商船的。这些船由人来控制。

一个涉及 WBED 的攻击可能涉及一个或多个高速快艇，这些快艇携带小武器和 RPG。船长应该认识到这些攻击的意图是造成损害，不一定要登上船。防止快艇与船体接触是缓解措施但是作用有限。

P12-第 3 节
威胁与风险评估
威胁评估
威胁评估必须包括所有区域安全威胁。
作为每一个船舶风险评估的一部分，在通过 HRA 之前，最新的军事威胁建议必须从 UKMTO 和威胁评估获得（见附件 A）。

威胁是由能力、意图和机会形成的。

能力意味着攻击者有物理手段进行攻击。意图是通过持续攻击来证明的。机会是通过本指南所述的措施来减轻公司、船舶和船员的被攻击成功率。除本指南所提供的信息外，可从附件 A 所列的区域报告中心和组织中寻求关于威胁特征、具体或新策略和区域背景因素的补充信息。

如果三角形的一边被移除，那么风险就最小化了。公司/船东不能影响能力或意图，因此 BMP 措施关注于最小化机会。

P13-风险评估
风险评估是安全管理系统中航程规划的一个组成部分。
风险评估应确定预防、缓解和恢复措施，
这意味着将法定法规与补充措施相结合。公司
也应考虑这些措施，船舶通过 VRA，即使他们没有进入 HRA。
进一步的风险评估指南可以在全球反盗版指南中找到。
风险评估必须考虑，但不限于：
船旗国、公司、租船人和保险公司的要求。
威胁评估和地理区域的风险增加。
形成背景的背景因素，例如交通模式和当地的生活模式，
包括渔船活动。
与军方合作。应该从 UKMTO 获得对存在的理解。
私人承包的武装安全人员（PCASP）的实施。
•船舶的特性、脆弱性和固有能力，包括安全舱和/或安全集合点以抵御威胁（干舷、速度、总体布置等）。

船舶和公司的程序（演习、值班名单、指挥链、决策过程等）。

该地区的所有航行都需要使用所有可用的信息进行全面的高级规划。海上威胁是动态的，因此，必须对区域内的每一次航行和活动完成详细的威胁和风险评估。

P14-规划

公司规划

与下列各项一起，风险评估的输出将有助于制定船舶航行计划：

定期审查威胁和风险评估。应根据需要更新计划。

船舶安全评估（SSA）、船舶安全计划（SSP）和船舶硬化计划（VHP）综述。

向船长介绍集团转送和国家车队的推荐路线、更新计划和要求。

公司规定的船舶防护措施（SPM）。

私人海上保安公司（PMSCs）的尽职调查，以期可能使用 PCASP。

公司应该考虑隐藏位置发射设备的位置，作为劫持者的第一个行动之一是禁用所有可见的通信和跟踪设备和天线。

审查公司人员配备要求。考虑不必要的船员下船。

船员培训计划。

信息安全

为避免关键航行信息落入坏人手中，建议如下：

与外部各方的沟通应保持在最低限度，密切关注组织交会点和等待位置。

电子邮件的代理，租船人和钱德勒应控制和电子邮件内的信息保持简洁，包含最低限度是合同要求。

P15-船舶总体规划

在进入自愿报告区之前

获取最新的威胁信息。

检查最新的导航区域警告和警报。

执行第 6 条和附件 D 和 E 中强调的 VRA／MSCHA 船舶登记和报告要求。

如果使用，确认 PCASP 登船计划。

确认主机可以全速运行。

进入高危地区之前

根据 SSP 实施安全措施。

简练船员演练

船员应充分准备的准备和演习应进行 SPM 到位。该计划应进行审查，所有船员简要介绍他们的职责，包括熟悉报警信号，攻击，一个明确的情况和适当的反应。

演习应测试：

SPM，包括测试所有接入点的安全性。

锁定条件，包括船员安全考虑。

桥梁团队的安全知识。

• 船员对海盗袭击事件所需的任何不同行动的理解与其他类型的攻击相比较。

其他考虑

准备和测试应急通信计划。船长应准备一个应急通信计划，包括所有必要的紧急联系号码（见附件 A）和准备好的信息，这些信息应在所有外部通信站（包括安全集合点和/或避难所）附近或永久地显示。

通信设备和船舶安全警报系统（SSAS）应进行测试。

定义船舶自动识别系统（AIS）政策。建议 AIS 应始终通过 VRA 和 HRA 的通道继续通行，以确保军队能够跟踪船舶，但限制数据到船舶的身份、位置、航向、航速、航行状态和安全相关信息。

重新安排 HRA 运输关键设备的计划维护。

P16-进入高风险地区

在第 6 条和附录 D 和 E 中提交船舶报告。

监视最新威胁信息。

确保所有接入点受到限制和控制。

避免漂移，等待，锚定和慢车，特别是在 MSTC。

尽量减少使用甚高频并使用电子邮件或安全的卫星电话代替。在可能的情况下，只回答 VHF 上已知或合法的呼叫者，记住冒名顶替者是可能的。

P17-第 5 节

船舶防护措施

本节重点介绍了提供分层保护的已验证 SPM。BMP 是基于区域性的攻击经验，并且随着方法的改变将继续发展。

SPM 的实施将在航程规划过程中得到识别。

公司可能希望考虑对超出 BMP 范围的船舶作进一步的修改，和/或提供额外的设备和/或人员作为进一步降低攻击风险的手段。

守望增强警觉

船长应采取以下行动，协助提高船上警戒水平。

提供额外的、充分介绍的了望。

保持高度警惕。

缩短瞭望观察周期，以最大限度地提高了望员的警觉性。

为增强的桥梁团队保持是够的双筒望远镜，最好是防眩光。

考虑使用热成像光学和夜视仪，因为它们提供了可靠的全天候、昼夜监测能力。

保持仔细的雷达监视和监视所有航行警告

通信，特别是甚高频和 GMDSS 警报。

考虑在船上的战略位置放置的假人，让更多的船员观看。

P18-

考虑使用 CCTV 和固定搜索灯进行更好的监控。固定的搜索灯可以阻止船尾靠近。

在桥翼上安装反海盗镜，使后部看起来更容易。

有效的了望是船舶防护的最有效方法。它可以帮助早期识别可疑的方法或攻击，从而允许部署防御。

部署

船长和船员应练习操纵船舶，以确保熟悉船舶的操纵特性。主人也应该练习回避动作，同时保持尽可能好的速度。经验表明，这种行动甚至可以打败一个漫长而坚决的攻击，因为静水压力的产生比速度具有更好的防御效果。

只有在安全的情况下，才能进行避免海盗登船的演习。

警告
船上的警报通知船上的船员海盗正在进行攻击，并警告袭击者船只已意识到并正在作出反应。此外，连续鸣笛的船只哨声可能分散攻击者注意力。
重要的是：
警报是独特的，以避免混乱。
船员熟悉每一个警报，特别是那些警告的攻击和指示"全部清除"。
所有警报需要安装在住宿和甲板 PA 系统。
演习是为了确保整个船听到警报。演习将记录并确认所有船员到安全位置的时间。

P19-物理屏障
物理障碍旨在使攻击者尽可能难以通过增加那些试图非法登船的人的攀登难度。在规划障碍物设置时，应特别考虑艉楼甲板。
剃刀钢丝
又称刺绳网。如果有适当的操纵和安全，就会产生有效的屏障。刺绳网的质量差别很大，较低质量刺绳网效果较差。建议如下：
使用具有 730mm 或 980mm 线圈直径的高张力手环式刺绳网。用手工工具很难切割。
使用双层。如果这是不可能的，放置一个高质量的船舷外侧的船体结构。
正确地将刺绳网固定在船上，以防止攻击者将其拉断。例如，将至少第三个钢丝环安装到船栏杆上。
将钢缆穿过其核心。
使用个人防护设备和钢丝钩移动和安装刺绳网。
将刺绳网设置成短的一段，例如 10m，这样移动起来更容易，也更安全。
在终端处保持刺绳网避开系泊导缆，以避免系泊操作的干扰。

P20-其他物理障碍
其他障碍已经被证明是有效的-从悬挂摆动的障碍到特殊设计的悬挂保护，防止通过爬过船栏杆来非法登船。

喷水泡沫监测仪
水喷雾和/泡沫的使用能有效地阻止或延迟任何企图非法登船的企图。水的使用会使一艘未经授权的船只很难并肩航行，这使得登船变得更加困难。
建议软管和泡沫监视器（输送水）固定在适当位置以覆盖可能的接入线路并进行远程操作。不建议手动激活，因为这可能将操作员置于暴露位置。
改进的水覆盖可以通过使用喷射软管的消防软管和使用在喷嘴前面固定短距离的挡板来实现。
水枪在垂直的弧形弧线中输送水，可以保护船体的大部分。
带有喷嘴的喷水轨产生一个覆盖较大区域的水幕。
泡沫可以使用，但它必须保证船舶的标准灭火设备库存之外额外的部分。泡沫设置定向障碍，并且非常滑。
需要使用所有可用的消防和通用泵，以确保所有防御有效运行。

在使用泵时可能需要额外的动力；支撑系统应该准备好并立即可用。

需要实践、观察和演练，以确保设备有效地覆盖脆弱地区。

P21-增强型桥梁保护

驾驶桥通常是进攻的焦点。在某些情况下，攻击者将他们的武器发射到驾驶台上，以恐吓船上的船员减速或停船。如果海盗登上这艘船，他们通常会控制驾驶台从而控制船舶。

可以考虑以下增强：

桥窗是层叠的，但通过防爆膜的应用可以提供对飞玻璃的进一步保护。

•金属（钢/铝）板的侧桥和后桥窗口和桥式机翼门窗口，可以迅速固定到位的情况下，攻击可以大大降低风险的伤害碎片。

钢线网眼围栏可以用来减少 RPG 的影响。

沙袋可以在桥翼上提供额外的保护。他们应该定期检查，以确保他们没有退化。

控制生活区和机械空间

重要的是要控制进入住所和机械空间的通路，以阻止或延迟进入。必须致力于拒绝进入这些空间。

紧急情况下，海员逃生路线必须保持畅通。

当舱门或舱口位于载人舱的逃生通道上时，必须从里面打开。当门或舱门被锁定时，从内部打开门是必要的。

P22-门和舱口提供桥梁，住宿和机械空间应妥善保护，以防止他们从外面打开。

一旦门和舱门被固定，指定的和有限的数量被用于安全巡逻和常规访问。这些门或舱门的使用应该由值班人员控制。

拦下外部楼梯或拆除通廊上的梯子，以防止使用和限制桥梁的外部通道。

除了任何锁，门和舱门必须完全关闭，以防止水密完整。在可能的情况下，可以使用附加的紧固机构，例如钢丝绳。

在驾驶员登机点附近应使用可拆卸的障碍物，这样在到达港口之前，船舶不需要拆卸大型区域。

海盗们已知通过舷窗和窗户进入通道。在舷窗和窗户上安装钢筋会防止这种情况发生。

应向船员介绍控制生活区、机械空间和储藏室进出的程序。

必须拒绝攻击者控制船舶推进系统。

安全集合点和/或避难所

公司风险评估和规划过程应确定船舶内安全集合点和/或堡垒的位置。

安全集合点

一个安全的集合点是一个指定的区域，为船员提供最大的物理保护，并在规划过程中容易被船员识别。

如果威胁评估识别出可能导致水线上或下方的船体破损的风险，那么必须确定水线以上的安全集合点。在许多船只中，中央楼梯可以提供一个安全的位置，因为它是由住宿块保护，并在水线以上。

P23-为了最小化爆炸的影响，应该考虑爆炸的可能路径。应该考虑到安全集合点。避难所是一个指定的区域，在海盗即将登船的情况下，所有船员都可以寻求保护。避难所被设计和建造以抵抗暴力进入。避难所的使用不能保证军事或执法的成因。

建造可靠的通讯设备（最好是卫星电话和甚高频）必须提供食物、水和卫生设施。控制推进和转向可以在攻击过程中提供有效的保护。如果使用避难所，他们必须补充，而不是替代所有其他 SPM。

必须使用避难所，SSP 应该确定条件和支持后勤使用。

值得注意的是，军事力量在登上船只之前可能适用下列标准：

所有的船员必须在避难所中被确认。

与避难所进行双向沟通。

船长应该决定何时使用避难所。

P24-其他措施

闭路电视

一旦攻击正在进行，就很难评估攻击者是否已经进入该船。使用 CCTV 覆盖允许从较少暴露的位置监视攻击的进展程度。一些公司可以从岸上监控和记录拍摄视频，这将在军事力量上船候极具价值。应考虑以下事项：

CCTV 摄像机覆盖脆弱地区，特别是船尾甲板和桥梁。

CCTV 监视器位于桥梁和安全集合点/避难所。

CCTV 录像可能在攻击后提供有用的证据，并且应该保留。

照明

照明很重要，推荐如下：

舱室甲板周围的照明甲板和船尾甲板上的后向照明以显示意识。

如果安装，搜索灯应立即可用。

一旦攻击者已被识别或攻击开始，如果安装，侧照明应该打开。这会使袭击者眩晕，并帮助船上的船员看到他们。

夜间，只需显示航行灯。

航行灯不应在夜间关闭，因为违反国际规则和碰撞风险高于被攻击的危险。

在锚地，甲板上的灯应该保持开启，明亮的船不易受到攻击。

关闭所有内部住宿灯，阻止海盗进入或迷惑那些可能已经进入的人。

不要使用船只备用的工具和设备，确保船只的备用工具或设备可以用来抵御海盗进入船舶。可用于攻击者的工具和设备应存储在安全位置。

上甲板设备的保护

应考虑提供弹道防护，以保护可燃液体的气瓶或容器。

过量的气瓶应该存放在安全的位置，或者如果可能的话，在抵达危险水域之前之

前安排妥当。

P25-私营海上保安公司

这一部分为 PMSCs 的使用提供指导。PMSC 可以提供武装或徒手服务。对武装部队使用的进一步指导（PCASP）如下。

BMP 不推荐或认可在商用船上使用 PMSC；这是由船旗国和任何沿海国家允许的单个船舶经营人作出的决定。然而，使用有经验的和胜任的无武装的 PMSC 可以是一种有价值的保护措施，特别是在可能需要与当地执法机构、海军和海岸警卫队进行接口和协调的情况下。

参与 PMSC 服务的任何决定都应考虑：

当前的威胁和风险环境。

公司的风险评估。

航次计划要求。

船舶速度。

干舷

操作类型，例如地震勘测或电缆敷设。

海军、海岸警卫队和海警提供的保护级别。

某些状态不允许部署私人武装安保。

建议航运公司只雇用被认可为现行的 ISO28007—1:2015 准则的私营海上保安公司（PMSC），其在船上提供私人合同的武装保安人员（PCASP）。

PMSC 合同必须：

在船东和 PMSC 之间。

不影响船舶的保险覆盖安排。

确保 PMSC 具有现行的、符合合同要求的保险政策。

明确识别使用武力的程序。

确认船长在船上的权威地位。

私人签约武装安全人员

参与 PMSC 服务的任何决定都应考虑 PMSC 以上的指导以及以下内容。

BMP 不推荐或认可私人海事安保船上商船的一般用途；这是由船旗国和任何沿海国家允许的单个船舶经营人作出的决定。

P26-公司必须检查 PMSC 的证书和许可证，并在适当情况下检查，以确保它们已由适当的权威机构发布，并合法地应对所识别的威胁。

一些状态不允许部署 PCASP。一些船旗国提供军事船只保护分队（VPDS）代替 P。VPD 可由另一状态提供。在某些情况下，PCASP 或 VPDS 的部署必须由国旗状态报告和确认，并在进入 VRA 时报告（见第 6 节和附录 D 和 E）。

船长保持权威性

如果私人保安承包商上船，必须清楚船长的权威。

使用 PCASP 的力量（RUF）规则必须在船旗国和公司中接受。

船东和 PCASP 应：

·

清楚理解并承认合同中所列出的违约责任。

·

有文件授权运输武器和弹药。

·

确保所有涉及武器和武装力量的事件最早报告给国旗国和首席安全官（CSO）。
PCASP 必须：

·

按照约定的 RUF 行事，这应为在船上为船员提供武力的应用提供合理的、合理的、比例的和必要的升级。
PCASP 只应作为一个额外的缓解和保护层，而不是作为其他措施的替代。携带 PCASP 的决定是公司风险评估的一个输出，一个横跨 HRA 而没有 PCASP 的船舶可以被认为完全符合 BMP。船员不得使用或使用枪支。

P27-第 6 节
报告
强烈鼓励所有船只通知军事组织的行动，因为这对提高军事态势意识和反应能力至关重要。一旦船舶开始航行，重要的是继续报告，本章和附录 C、D 和 E 的指导方针是为了确保共同理解。要联系的两个主要军事组织是英国- Maritime 贸易行动（UKMTO）。
和海事安全中心-非洲之角（MSCHA）。

UKMTO 作为商船及其民间组织的主要接触点，为该地区的军事力量提供联络。
UKMTO 管理自愿报告计划，鼓励商船定期发送报告。这些包括：
1。初始报告（进入 VRA 后）。
2。每日报告（船舶位置、航向和速度的更新）。

三。最后报告（离开 VRA 或到达港口）。
4。可疑/不规则活动的报告（必要时）。
UKMTO 能够与船舶和民间组织直接沟通，以便传播。
区域内事件的警告和警告：
警告：简单的消息描述事件发生在 LAT/ROM 和时间。这通常伴随着直接 UKMTO 在指定的事件半径内向所有船只发出电话呼叫，以使船舶尽可能早地发出警报。
警告：这是下一层对船只的警报，通常是在该区域内相关的目击/报告。
UKMTO 在其网站 www. UkMto. Org 提供定期信息，并在每周报告中总结了前一周的活动。UKMTO 还能够提供和民间组织的机会，进行演习，以支持他们的通道规划在该地区。有兴趣的公司可以联系 UKMTO + 44（0）2392 222060 或 TwiteKePurs@ UKMto. Org。
船舶及其操作人员应完成 UKMTO 船舶位置报告表，并与 MSCHA 注册。

P28-欧盟海军

MSCHA 是欧盟海军（欧盟海军）的规划和协调中心。MSCHA 鼓励公司在进入 HRA 之前登记他们的船舶运动，如果他们通过他们的网站 www. MsHo.Org 参与团体运输系统。

当离开 VRA 时，船舶应该知道邻近的区域报告要求，例如：北约航运中心（地中海-海图 Q6010）和 ReCAAP 信息共享中心/新加坡信息融合中心（SeaAsia -图 Q6012）。

欧盟 Navor 和联合海上力量（CMF）产生行业可释放威胁评估（IRTA）来帮助公司的风险管理。威胁评估利用军事知识和情报来共同了解该地区的威胁和趋势。IRTAs 受到业界可发布威胁公告（IRTBS）的赞扬，它涵盖特定事件。这些文件是一个重要的资源，应该被视为威胁和风险评估过程的一部分。

海员在改善区域海事安全中的作用
虽然一些海上威胁和犯罪不直接危害海员，但他们有机会为海上安全作出贡献。经验表明，海上安全不能通过执法机构和军队单独行动来改善；在该地区工作的海员可以有所帮助。在索马里和也门海岸，海军、海岸警卫队和执法机构的资源有限，这一点更为重要。

鼓励报告可疑活动，并提供尽可能多的细节。如果有可能在不损害安全的情况下做到这一点，可疑活动的照片、视频和雷达绘图数据对主管当局具有巨大价值。如果怀疑该活动是否可疑，则鼓励船只报告。

向 UKMTO 报告可疑活动
UKMTO 可以就区域海事共同体的活动类型提出建议。帮助识别可疑活动的指南在附件 C 中，可疑/不规则活动报告在附件 D 中。通常，海员不报告可疑活动，因为它们可能涉及到港口国的进一步调查和可能延误的船舶。UKMTO 将以匿名形式接收的信息转发给授权采取行动的最合适的机构。虽然可疑活动可能显得无关紧要，但当添加到其他报告中时，它可能是非常有价值的。

P29-第 7 节
遭受攻击的船只
一般一艘船可能受到很少或没有警告的攻击。有效的观察，视觉和雷达，将有助于确保早期检测。
在可疑的情况下，或者如果有任何疑问，立即调用 UKMTO。

海上攻击
携带武器的海盗通常不开火，直到他们离船非常近，例如在 0.2 海里内。
抓紧时间，无论多么短，激活任何额外的保护措施和计划。这将使攻击者清楚地看到，船员已经准备好了，这艘船已经准备好了，并且将抵抗登船的企图。

接近阶段
有效的了望可能有助于确定攻击的性质，海盗或其他攻击的威胁概况最初看起来相似，而且直到攻击者接近，攻击的性质变得明显。在所有情况下，应采取以下

步骤：
如果没有全速，增加到全速以拉开距离。
引导直线航向保持最大速度。

启动船舶应急程序。

激活应急通信计划。

根据紧急情况发出紧急警报并发出攻击通知

船舶应急通信计划。

在 VHF CH 16 上做遇险的呼叫。通过数字选择发送遇险消息

调用（DSC）系统和 InMARSAT-C，如适用。

激活 SSAS。

立即通过电话向 UKMTO（+ 44 2392 - 222060）报告攻击。

确保 AIS 接通。

P30-·

激活水喷雾。

确保所有的外门，并在可能的情况下，内部公共房间和舱室完全关闭。

所有在桥上或机舱中不需要的人员都应该按照船长指示的安全集合点或避难所来集合。

当海况允许时，考虑改变航向，以增加接近的小艇暴露在风/浪中。

连续发出船笛/雾号，向任何潜在的攻击者证明船只知道袭击并对其作出反应。

检查船舶数据记录仪（VDR）正在记录。

PCASP，如果存在，将采取一致的行动来警告攻击者。

进攻阶段

攻击者接近时，应采取以下步骤：

再次确认所有船员都在船长指示的安全地点或安全舱。

确保 SSAS 已被激活。

如果 SSAS 不行动，立即报告攻击 UKMTO（+ 44 2392 222060）通过电话。

当攻击者在船上接近时，船长应该开始对舵进行小的改变，同时保持速度以阻止小艇躺在船旁准备登机。这些演习将产生额外的清洗，以阻止小艇的运作。

不推荐使用大量舵，因为这可能会显著降低船的速度。

正在检查 VDR 数据。

PCASP，如果存在的话，将由 RUF 管辖。

非法登船行为

船舶非法登船后，应当采取下列措施：

从船上走下去，然后停止引擎。

所有其余船员进入避难所或安全集合点，锁定所有内部门的路线。

PCASP，如果存在，将遵循与公司和硕士同意的程序。

确保所有船员都在避难所或安全集合点。这包括船长、驾驶台团队和 PCASP。

P31-建立与 UKMTO 和贵公司的通信，并确认

所有船员都被占在避难所或安全集合点。

呆在避难所里，直到条件迫使你离开或被军方告知。

·如果船员中有任何成员被抓获，则应认为海盗已完全控制船舶。

船舶的控制。

如果失去对船舶的控制权
所有的行动都应该冷静、缓慢和慎重。船员应保持
双手始终可见并完全遵守海盗的要求。这将大大降低暴力的风险。
经验表明，海盗将是咄咄逼人的，高度激动的。

药物或酒精的影响。
要有耐心。
保持精神上的活跃/忙碌。
记住时间。
尽可能地保持身体活动，尽可能减少压力。
保持镇静，保持尊严。
一定要积极（记住，当局正在不懈地努力释放你）。
记得留下任何 CCTV 或录音设备运行。
准确地描述攻击者的要求并遵守他们的指令。
不要拍照。
不要试图攻击攻击者。
不要做可能被误解为攻击性的动作。
不要对抗。
不要抗拒。

P32-劫持人质情况
索马里海盗行动的模式是劫持船只并扣押船员赎金。应该记住，维护海盗和船员的安全是符合海盗利益的。
每一个公司或组织都应该有一个政策来保护绑架和赎金的最终结果。以下原则是维持绑架的准则。
保持镇静，保持自我控制。
对海盗要谦恭有礼。
注意你同事的情况。
尽可能保持团队合作。
接受新的海盗领导。
一定要保持等级。
尽量与海盗建立正常的沟通。
保持个人卫生。
节约用水。
一定要积极——很多人都在努力释放你。
要有耐心并保持常规（包括你的精神需求，如海盗所允许的）。
尽量保持你的呼吸正常。
冥想和保持精神活动。
尊重宗教：尊重你的，你的同事和海盗。
不要抗拒。
不要和海盗或你的同事争论。
不要拍照。
不要藏贵重物品。
不要在感情上做出反应。

不要服用毒品或酒精。

不要与海盗讨价还价，享受个人特权。

P33-在军事干预的情况下

在船上的任何军事行动中，准备并充分配合船员，并指示船员如下。

其他威胁的攻击

反舰导弹在事件或警告导弹攻击时应遵循军事建议。如果没有收到警告，就没有时间采取任何缓解超出 PA 警告船员如果导弹被发现。商船不太可能成为预期的目标；船长应该知道他们附近的船舶阴谋，如果海上空间允许，保持海军和相关船只的畅通。

海雷

船舶应避免所有公布或确定的危险区域，并与军事当局保持密切联系。如果靠近雷区操作，船长应该知道拴缆的海雷可能会断裂并漂移到航道。船舶应避开漂浮物，船员应远离船头区域。有效的了望是必不可少的。在海雷危险区作业时，可以从 UKMTO 获得具体的保护措施。

恐怖袭击

在攻击的早期阶段可能无法区分海盗或恐怖攻击。在本指南中强调的针对海盗攻击的方法阶段应采取的初步行动应该是跟随船舶。军事威胁评估指示一种攻击比另一种攻击更可能发生的区域。一艘载有多人的快艇不太可能是恐怖袭击，因为这些船通常无人驾驶或 1 人单独操作。

恐怖袭击可能导致船体裂开。建议在进入安全舱之前使用在水线以下的安全集合点。

P34-如果预期是恐怖袭击，反应时间很短。下图给出了可能的反应时间的例子。

威胁和风险评估将确定这些威胁发生的区域，如果成功的话，可能会导致爆炸（通常称为爆炸）。在进入威胁区域之前，船长应与船员沟通，如果检测到爆炸威胁，将采取什么措施。船长可以考虑告诉船员：

平躺在甲板上，因为这可以减少暴露，并可以减少对身体的影响。

采取支撑姿势（手臂/腿弯曲，双手握住某物坚实，脚牢固地固定在甲板上），以保护人员免受冲击波影像。

离开特定区域，如左舷、右舷、船尾甲板或机舱。

恐怖袭击之后
确保所有船员和 PSCAP 都知情。
发送遇险信号。
调查爆炸发生的区域。
实施损害控制。
呼叫 CSO 和 UKMTO。

P35-事后事件行动与报告
攻击后的时期将是困难的，因为公司，船长和船员从苦难中恢复过来。重要的是，海员接受及时和适当的医疗评估，无论是身体和心理，以及在袭击或人质情况下的护理。公司应该有应急管理计划来管理攻击的影响。

从他们的一艘船上的任何被识别的威胁。这些计划应该包括对一个旷日持久的人质谈判情况的管理，包括对被绑架船员家属的支持。

为使调查当局有机会逮捕肇事者，以正确的方式保存证据是很重要的。公司、船长和船员应参照国际海事组织关于保存和收集证据和其他行业指南的准则。

在任何攻击或可疑活动之后，在最初报告事件之后，完成详细报告是至关重要的。报告的复印件应寄给公司、国旗国和有关当局。重要的是，任何报告都是详尽而全面的。这将有助于全面分析和威胁活动的趋势。

在没有证据支持的情况下,包括受事件影响的证人的陈述,嫌犯不太可能被起诉。

证据保护
船长和船员可以保护犯罪现场,直到指定的执法机构遵守以下基本原则:
如果可能的话,保留犯罪现场和所有证据。
避免污染或干扰所有可能的证据——如有疑问,请勿触摸并留置物品。
不要清理这个区域,包括冲洗它。不要扔掉任何东西,不管它看起来多么不重要。
接受船员的初步陈述。
从多个角度拍摄犯罪现场的照片。
保护 VDR 以备将来的证据。
列出所携带物品的清单（如手机号码）。
促进进入犯罪现场和执法当局的相关文件。
让执法人员接受采访。
证据的收集和保护是至关重要的。

P36-调查
提供证据的质量和船员作证的有效性将大大有助于随后的任何调查或起诉。

在任何攻击或事件之后,调查当局将由外部因素决定,包括:
标记状态。
所有权。
船员国籍。
领导执法机构将与船长和船员交谈,了解事件的先后顺序和情况。
在人质后的情况下,执法当局可能要求进行释放后的船员遣散,并收集证据,调查和起诉后被俘。

海员应始终受到尊重,成为犯罪的受害者。

忠告
国际刑警组织有一个安全的网站,为那些被劫持船只的操作员提供支持。国际刑警组织的海事工作组可以协助采取适当的措施,以保持犯罪现场遗留下来的证据的完整性。国际刑警组织有一个指挥和协调中心（CCC）,它支持面临危机或需要紧急行动援助的 188 个成员国中的任何一个。CCC 在国际刑警组织的四种官方语言（英语、法语、西班牙语和阿拉伯语）中运作,一天工作 24 小时,一年365 天。建议船舶经营人在劫持船舶三天内与国际刑警组织联系。
还可以咨询国际刑警组织,讨论保存证据的推荐做法,这对执法人员进行调查可能是有用的。联系细节是:电子邮件 os-ccc@interpol.int;电话+ 33 472 44 44。
彻底调查所有可用的证据是至关重要的。

P37-海员福利
海员和他们的家人往往难以表达援助的需要,甚至认识到他们在暴露于安全威胁之后需要援助。该公司应监测那些受到海盗和其他海上安全威胁的人的身体健康和精神健康状况,必要时提供独立支持和其他援助,这可能是适当的。有一系列人道主义方案旨在协助海员及其家属受到海盗或海上犯罪的影响,包括国际海员

福利和援助网络和海员任务。

P41-
附件 B
海上安全图
海上安全图包含安全关键信息，以协助船员通过高危险区域进行安全通道的规划。UKMTO 通过与北约和其他政府组织的合作收集了所有信息，确保每张图表都有最准确、最新和验证过的信息。

每个海上安全图包括：
•关于航行安全的危险信息，包括海盗、恐怖主义、禁运、海雷战、禁区、封锁和非法捕捞。这些信息与官方导航图一起使用，有助于确保船舶、船员和货物的安全。
•一般安全建议、自我保护措施、安全程序和区域接触，以及军事或安全部队执行的路由和报告要求。

P42-
附件 C
共识
在报告攻击和可疑活动时，有一个共同的理解是很重要的。
以下是帮助评估什么是攻击或什么构成可疑活动的指导方针。

攻击
对船只、船员或货物的暴力行为，或使用暴力的任何企图。
未经授权企图登上船舶，船长怀疑此人是海盗或其他未经授权的人。
如果武器或 RPG 发射。
试图把船撞到船体上。
导弹发射瞄准。
一个实际的登船操作，是否成功地获得了对船的控制权。
试图翻过栏杆使用如下工具：
梯子。
抓钩。
在船上使用的武器。

可疑活动
船上船员人数相对于其船舶大小。
最近的接近点。
船上存在不寻常和非捕鱼设备，例如梯子、攀登钩或大量燃料。
一艘船拖曳多个小艇或船上有小艇。
船只的类型对于当前位置来说是不寻常的。
高速航行的小艇。
如果船舶出现无人驾驶。
AIS 未显示船舶信息。
这艘船没有悬挂旗帜。

船同时悬挂两个或两个以上的旗帜。

远离海岸的小艇。

渔船在正常捕鱼区以外捕鱼。

船舶的窗户被盖住或者被取消。

P43-

船夫/小艇漂流。

数小时黑暗中没有灯光。

带有两个或更多舷外马达的小艇。

船夫/小艇在水中停留，没有捕鱼的证据。

游荡在索科特拉岛东部、马克兰海岸以南或桑给巴尔附近的船只；

达累斯萨拉姆、彭巴、塞拉莱、Ras Fartek 或爱尔兰共和军。

包裹悬挂在船外。

过多的通信天线。

这不是一个详尽的清单。其他事件、活动和船舶可被商船船长视为可疑，而该商船应适当考虑其在该区域内的海上经验和海事团体之间共享的信息。如果有疑问，报告并联系 UKMTO。

P44-

UKMTO 报告表格

UKMTO 船舶位置报告表

一旦船舶发送了进入 VRA 的初始报告，UKMTO 将要求发送每日报告。一旦到达港口或退出 VRA，UKMTO 将要求最终报告。下面提供下列形式，并可在 www.UkMto.Org 提供：

初步报告。

每日报告。

最后报告。

可疑/不规则活动报告。

P46-附录 E

海上安全中心非洲之角报告表格

船舶登记和事故报告

MSCHOA 的注册确保一艘船只在 HRA 期间通过军事反海盗部队进行监视。此外，定期的威胁评估更新、警告和最新的自我保护信息可供注册的船舶公司和船长使用。

如在 UKMTO 海图 Q6099 中所强调的，MSCHA 船舶注册区域内需要注册。

在 MSCHA 网站和 UKMTO 图表 Q6099 上有"注册船只移动"的表格。应注意以下事项：

有两种主要方法来注册你船的移动与 MSCHA。

——

在线 www. mschoa.Org（注意你需要注册 MSCHOA 来访问，这可以在网站上的注册选项卡上完成）。

——

脱机。可下载的表单可从 www. mschoa.org 获得，也可以通过邮箱获得：postmaster@mschoa.org 请求。这种形式在 2018 年 3 月更新，使离线注册更容易注册。

如果上述选项是不可能的，船舶可以通过发送邮件，主题邮件标题MSCHOA Vessel Registration 注册到postmaster@mschoa.org 与下表中的信息。

下列带星号内容为必填内容。

Vessel Details

Ship Name *	Flag State *
IMO Number *	MMSI Number *
Call Sign *	Ship's Master
Primary Email *	Secondary Email
Ship contact number *	Ship contact email *
Owner name	Operator name
Operator address	DPA name
DPA telephone	DPA email

Movement Details

Entry Point to MSCHOA vessel registration area * (78°E/10°S/23°N/Suez/Port)	Entry Date/Time to MSCHOA vessel registration area * (DD/MM/YYYY) (HH) (MM)
Exit Point from MSCHOA vessel registration area * (78°E/10°S/23°N/Suez/Port)	Exit Date/Time to MSCHOA vessel registration area * (DD/MM/YYYY) (HH) (MM)
Do you intend to transit the IRTC?	
ETA to IRTC (times are in UTC/ Zulu time) *	
Direction * (East/West)	
Do you intend to join a group transit?	Do you intend to join a National Convoy?
	Which National Convoy are you joining? *
Crew numbers and nationalities	Draught
Freeboard of lowest accessible deck in Metres(M) *	Planned Transit Speed *
Vessel's Maximum Speed *	Cargo (Crude Oil/Clean Oil/Arms/ Chemicals/ Gas/Passengers/Bulk Cargo/ Containers/Fishing/Ballast/ Others … Please Specify)
	Hazardous cargo
Next Port of Call	Last Port of Call
Number of Armed Security personnel on board?	Nationality of armed security team?

P48-MSCHA 和 UCMTO 的后续报告

在任何攻击或可疑活动之后，向 UKMTO 和 MSCHA 提供详细的事件报告是至关重要的。向 IMB 提供报告的副本也很有帮助。

事故报告；船舶资料/细节

人们认识到，在一个事件期间可能是短暂的，船员将受到一定的压力。带星号标记的线是极端情况下必须报告的关键要求。没有这些数据，评估将是不完整的，也可能是不准确的。表格如下下：

INCIDENT REPORTING PART ONE – VESSEL DETAILS				
Line			Responses / Inclusions	Format
(a)	(b)			(d)
IDENTITY	1.1	A*	SHIP NAME	PLAIN TEXT
		B*	IMO NUMBER	PLAIN TEXT
		C	FLAG	PLAIN TEXT
		D	CALL SIGN	PLAIN TEXT
		E	OWNER NAME & CONTACT DETAILS	PLAIN TEXT
		F	Company Security Officer / Designated Person Assure CONTACT DETAILS	PLAIN TEXT
CREW / CARGO	1.2	A	CREW NUMBER	PLAIN TEXT
		B	CREW NATIONALITIES	PLAIN TEXT
		C	CAPTAIN / MASTER NATIONALITY	PLAIN TEXT
		D	CARGO	PLAIN TEXT
		E	CARGO SIZE / QUANTITY	PLAIN TEXT
ROUTE / SCHEDULE	1.3	A	LAST PORT OF CALL (LPOC)	PLAIN TEXT
		B	LAST PORT OF CALL DATE	PLAIN TEXT
		C	NEXT PORT OF CALL (NPOC)	PLAIN TEXT
		D	NEXT PORT OF CALL DATE	PLAIN TEXT
		E	SEA DAYS SINCE LAST PORT	PLAIN TEXT

INCIDENT REPORTING PART TWO – INCIDENT DETAILS				
Line			Responses / Inclusions	Format
(a)	(b)			(d)
DETAILS	2.1*		TIME OF REPORT	DTG
	2.2	A*	INCIDENT LOCATION	LAT / LONG
		B*	SPEED AND HEADING AT TIME OF INCIDENT	PLAIN TEXT
	2.3	A*	INCIDENT START TIME	DTG
		B*	INCIDENT END TIME	DTG
		C	WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING EVENT	PLAIN TEXT
INCIDENT	2.4	A*	SIGHTING / APPROACH / COMMUNICATION / ATTACK / BOARDING	SELECT
		B	AREA(S) OF VESSEL TARGETED	PLAIN TEXT
SUSPECTS	2.5	A*	NUMBER OF SUSPECT CRAFT	NUMBER
		B	NUMBER OF SUSPECT INDIVIDUALS	NUMBER
		C	NOT KNOWN / CIVILIAN DRESS / UNIFORMS / MIX	SELECT
		D	ETHNICITY / LANGUAGES	PLAIN TEXT
WEAPONS	2.6	A*	NONE SEEN / SIGHTED / SHOTS FIRED	SELECT
		B	PISTOLS / RIFLES / MACHINE GUNS / GRENADE LAUNCHERS	SELECT
LADDERS	2.7	A	NONE SEEN / SUSPECTED / SIGHTED / USED	SELECT
		B	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION	PLAIN TEXT
CRAFT	2.8	A*	TYPE: WHALER / DHOW / FISHING VESSEL / MERCHANT VESSEL	SELECT
		B	DESCRIPTION OF VESSEL (COLOUR, NAME, FEATURES)	PLAIN TEXT

YOUR VESSEL	2.9	A*	CITADEL / SECURE AREA	YES / NO
		B*	NO SECURITY TEAM / UNARMED TEAM / ARMED TEAM	SELECT
		C	HEIGHT OF FREEBOARD AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT	PLAIN TEXT
		D	SELF PROTECTION MEASURES IN PLACE BEFORE INCIDENT	PLAIN TEXT
		E	DEFENCE MEASURES EMPLOYED	YES / NO
		F	OTHER	PLAIN TEXT
YOUR RESPONSE	2.10	A*	ALARM SOUNDED	YES / NO
		B*	CREW MUSTERED IN CITADEL	YES / NO
		C*	INCREASED SPEED / EVASIVE MANOEUVRES	SELECT
		D*	DESCRIPTION	SELECT
		E	PAST SHOWED WEAPONS / WARNING SHOTS / AIMED SHOTS / NO PAST	PLAIN TEXT
		F	WAS INCIDENT REPORTED TO AUTHORITIES? IF SO TO WHOM?	PLAIN TEXT
STATUS	2.11	A*	INCIDENT FINISHED / ONGOING	SELECT
		B	INCIDENT ENDED BY SUSPECTS / OWN VESSEL	YES / NO
		C	DETAIL	YES / NO

INCIDENT REPORTING PART THREE – STATUS AND SUPPORT REQUESTS				
Line			Responses / Inclusions	Format
(a)	(b)			(d)
STATUS	3.1	A*	VESSEL SAFE / UNSAFE / UNDER ATTACK / BOARDED	SELECT
		B	VESSEL UNDERWAY / VESSEL STATIC	SELECT
		C*	UNDER OWN POWER / SUPPORTED / WITHOUT POWER	SELECT
		D	NO DAMAGE / MINOR DAMAGE / MAJOR DAMAGE	SELECT
DAMAGE / MEDICAL	3.2	A*	DAMAGE DETAILS	PLAIN TEXT
		B	CREW AT STATIONS / CREW IN CITADEL / CREW OFF SHIP	SELECT
		C	CREW INJURIES	NUMBER
		D	INJURY DETAILS	PLAIN TEXT
		E	CREW FATALITIES	NUMBER
		F	FATALITY DETAILS	PLAIN TEXT
INTENTIONS	3.3	A*	CONTINUE AS PLANNED / RE-ROUTING	SELECT
		B*	REPAIR DAMAGE / ABANDON SHIP / SURRENDER CONTROL	PLAIN TEXT
		C	CURRENT SPEED	PLAIN TEXT
		D	CURRENT HEADING	PLAIN TEXT
		E	OTHER	PLAIN TEXT

		A	WAS THE INCIDENT RECORDED?	YES / NO
IMAGERY	3.4	B	CCTV FOOTAGE / PHOTOGRAPHS	SELECT
		C	IMAGERY ATTACHED (IF AVAILABLE PLEASE ATTACH)	YES / NO
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION	3.5	A	ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH MAY ASSIST?	PLAIN TEXT
		B	PLEASE ATTACH WITH THIS REPORT – A BRIEF DESCRIPTION / FULL REPORT / MASTER – CREW STATEMENT OF THE ATTACK	PLAIN TEXT

P53-附录 F

从事捕捞船舶的附加指导
有关捕捞船舶的指导已由下列全国渔业协会提供：
OPAGAC
ANABAC

对渔船的航行建议
非索马里渔船应避免在索马里海岸 200nm 以内操作或过境，而不论其是否已签发许可证。
当雷达显示有不明船只存在时，不要开始捕鱼作业。
如果海盗通常使用的一种类型的聚酯小艇，全速离开它们，驶入风浪中，使他们的航行更加困难。
避免夜间停车。保持警惕，保持驾驶台、甲板和机舱值班。
在捕鱼作业期间，船只更加脆弱，要警惕并保持雷达监视，以最大限度地通知您的船员和国家当局，如果正在进行中的攻击。
在夜间航行时，仅使用航行灯和必要的灯。
灯光会引起海盗注意，他们有时没有雷达，只是船上等待。
如果船只在夜间捕鱼时漂流，在甲板上和机舱和驾驶台保持警戒。只使用强制导航灯和安全灯。
发动机必须为立即启动做好准备。
远离未识别的船只。
尽量少使用 VHF，以避免被海盗听到，使定位变得更加困难。
当海上巡逻机在该区域操作时，打开 AIS，以便于识别和跟踪。

P54-识别

-

强烈建议渔船管理人员在索马里海岸外的整个活动期间向 MSCHOA 报告。如果可能的话，这应该包括在船船员员完整的船员名单。

-

在该地区进行捕鱼或捕捞作业之前进行培训。

-

每当渔船装备有船舶监控系统（VMS）设备时，它们的管理者应该为 MSCHA 提供对 VMS 数据的访问权限。

-

渔船应根据任何国际或国家反海盗行动的要求从航空器或船只上识别自己。

-

军事、商船和渔船应毫不迟延地响应渔船正在接近的任何识别请求（以便于早期行动使逃生成为可能，特别是如果该船只正在捕鱼）。

发生攻击

-

如果发生袭击或发现可疑的船只，警告当局（UKMTO 和 MSCHOA）和其他舰队。

-

船舶的第二船长（办公室总船长）的联系细节，其船舶的知识可以有助于军事干预的成功。

-

仅针对围网捕鱼者的建议：
——
疏散甲板上所有的船员和生活区。
——
如果海盗已经控制了船只，围网是展开状态，鼓励收回渔网。如果回收围网是允许的，遵循海盗的操纵指示，以避免误解。

P55-附录 G
包括游艇在内的休闲艇的附加建议

休闲艇应尽早与海军/军事当局联系，以确定 VRA 区域是否安全过境；区域活动表明大型船只和小型船只均发生攻击。应避免接近冲突地区的运输。在任何航程中，应与 UKMTO 保持密切接触。见 MSCHA（www. MSCHA.org）和国际帆船联合会
（最新信息）。

、
P56-附件 H
定义和缩写
定义

下面定义的术语和分类攻击和可疑事件，从船舶内部报告的 VRA 可能会有所帮助。这确保了模式和趋势的一致性识别。

持械抢劫罪是查处海盗罪和武装抢劫船舶罪的行为规范，凸显武装抢劫船舶罪的构成要件有：

•

任何非法的暴力行为或拘留行为，或除海盗行为以外的任何劫掠或威胁行为，在国家的内水、群岛水域和领海内，以私人目的结束，并指向该船舶或该船舶上的人或财产。

•

煽动或故意促进上述行为的任何行为。

攻击
海盗攻击与接近相对比，指的是船舶受到海盗小艇侵略的接近，且已经射出武器。

劫持
劫持指的是海盗违反船员意愿已经登船并控制船舶。劫持者不会总是有同样的目的（武装抢劫、货物盗窃或绑架）。

非法登船
非法登船指的是海盗登上了船只但并没有获得控制权。船长仍然保持控制。这方面最明显的例子是避难处情景。

海盗
1982 年联合国海洋法公约(UNCLOS) （第101 条）定义了"海盗"。然而在本最佳管理措施(BMP)内，重要的是给行业提供清晰、实际和可行的指导，准确和一致的评估可疑活动和海盗袭击。

以下可能有助于评估什么是海盗攻击。海盗攻击可能包括但不限于：

☐ 海盗攻击可能包括（但不限于），诸如以下的行动：

☐ 对船舶或人员使用暴力，或任何使用暴力的企图。

☐ 企图登上船长怀疑登船人是海盗的船舶。

☐ 无论对船获得控制成功与否的事实登船。

☐ 通过使用以下克服船舶保护措施的企图：

试图登船的工具：
梯子。
抓钩。
蓄意使用针对或直指船只的武器。

P57-可以认为另一种船只采取的可疑或侵略性的行动

另一种船采取的行动可能被视为可疑，如果发生下列任何情况（列表并未详尽）：

1. 由可疑船舶朝另一船舶伴有航速迅速增加的一定的航道改动，这在该区域当时的情况不能算作正常活动。

2. 小艇在不寻常的时期和距离使用同样的航道和航速航行，不符合该地区的正常捕捞或在其他情况。

3. 朝船舶突然改变航道和侵略行为。

缩写
自动识别系统
曼德布
海军陆战队联合部队
首席安全官
数字选择呼叫
欧盟海军部队
高危险区域
国际海事局
国际海事组织
IRTA 工业可释放威胁评估
IRTB 行业可发布威胁公告
国际运输组织建议的过境通道
联合战争委员会
海事安全委员会
非洲之角海事安全中心
海上安全过境通道
北约北大西洋公约组织
海盗行动小组
私人承包的武装安全人员
私人海上保安公司
打击海盗和武装的区域合作协定
亚洲船舶抢劫案
火箭发射榴弹

P58-使用武力的规则
SPM 船舶防护措施
船舶安全评估
船舶保安警报系统
船舶保安计划
TSS 业务分离方案
英国海上贸易业务
血管数据记录仪
VHP 容器硬化计划
VMS 船舶监控系统

船舶防护分队
自愿报告区
水性简易爆炸装置

BMP5

Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea

SAUDI ARABIA

OMAN

INDIA

ERITREA

YEMEN

DJIBOUTI

SOMALIA

ETHIOPIA

KENYA

TANZANIA

Produced and supported by:

BIMCO · CDI · CLIA · International Chamber of Shipping *Shaping the Future of Shipping* · UNITY FOR SAFETY AT SEA IFSMA · IGP&I International Group of P&I Clubs

IMCA · INTERCARGO · InterManager · IMEC · itf · INTERTANKO

IPTA International Parcel Tankers Association · ISWAN · Joint Hull Committee · Joint War Committee · THE MISSION TO SEAFARERS *Caring for seafarers around the world* · OCIMF · Sailors Society

SIGTTO · WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL PARTNERS IN TRADE · CONTACT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA · EU NAVFOR Somalia · MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE HORN OF AFRICA

ICC International Maritime Bureau · INFORMATION FUSION CENTRE · INTERPOL · ROYAL NAVY

BMP5

Best Management Practices to Deter
Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in
the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean
and Arabian Sea

Version 5 published June 2018

Authors: BIMCO, ICS, IGP&I Clubs, INTERTANKO and OCIMF

Contents

The fundamental requirements of BMP

Understand the threat
- Maritime threats are dynamic.
- Obtaining current threat information is critical for risk assessment and decision making.

Conduct risk assessments
- Companies must conduct risk assessments.
- Identify ship protection measures.

Implement ship protection measures
- Harden the ship.
- Brief and train the crew.
- Enhanced lookout.
- Follow Flag State and military guidance.

Report
- Report to UKMTO and register with MSCHOA.
- Report incidents and suspicious activity.
- Send distress signal when attacked.

Cooperate
- Cooperate with other shipping and military forces.
- Cooperate with law enforcement to preserve evidence.
- Cooperate with welfare providers.

Introduction

Seafarers have encountered different security threats when operating ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.

The purpose of this publication is to help ships plan their voyage and to detect, avoid, deter, delay and report attacks. Experience has shown application of the recommendations in this publication makes a significant difference to the safety of seafarers.

Piracy-specific Best Management Practice (BMP), international navies and capacity building ashore have helped to suppress piracy. However, Somali piracy has not been eradicated and remains a threat.

The BMP contained in this publication mitigates the risk from piracy and other maritime security threats.

Regional instability has introduced other maritime security threats, which include:

- Deliberate targeting of ships by extremist groups.
- Collateral damage arising from regional conflict.

BMP piracy measures are effective, but differences in attack methods from other threats may require other forms of mitigation. For example, attacks carried out by extremists may be more determined, as they may be willing to risk their lives.

The consequences of not adopting effective security measures can be severe. Some pirates have subjected hostages to violence and other ill treatment and periods of captivity for some hijacked seafarers have lasted for several years. Other attacks have demonstrated an intent to damage ships and endanger life.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (**www.ukmto.org**) and Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (**www.mschoa.org**) websites should be consulted for advice. See annex A for contact details.

This BMP complements piracy guidance in the latest International Maritime Organization (IMO) MSC Circulars (see **www.imo.org**) and advice on the Maritime Security Transit Corridor.

> **Nothing in this BMP detracts from the Master's overriding authority and responsibility to protect their crew, ship and cargo.**

Geographical area

The geography of the region is diverse and ranges from narrow choke points such as the Bab el Mandeb (BAM) Straits and the Strait of Hormuz to the wide-open ocean of the Somali basin. Each area presents different challenges and threats will vary.

Attacks on ships and seafarers have taken place throughout the region. Threats are dynamic; information should be sought from the organisations listed in annex A.

Voluntary Reporting Area

The UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is identified on maritime security charts such as UKHO Q6099. Ships entering and operating within the VRA are encouraged to register with the UKMTO. Registration establishes direct contact between the reporting ship and UKMTO.

MSCHOA vessel registration area

The MSCHOA vessel registration area is designed to inform military counter piracy forces of the transit of merchant ships in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The MSCHOA vessel registration area is defined on maritime security chart Q6099.

High Risk Area

A High Risk Area (HRA) is an industry defined area within the VRA where it is considered that a higher risk of attack exists, and additional security requirements may be necessary. The HRA is outlined on maritime security chart Q6099. It is important the latest information on current threats is used when planning routes through the HRA. Ships should be prepared to deviate from their planned route at short notice to avoid threats highlighted by navigation warnings or by military forces.

Maritime Security Transit Corridor

The Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) is a military established corridor upon which naval forces focus their presence and surveillance efforts. The MSTC is shown on maritime security chart Q6099 and the figure below and consists of:

- The Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).
  - The IRTC is not a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) but an established transit corridor in the Gulf of Aden where naval forces focus their counter piracy patrols. Within the IRTC, group transits and national convoys may be offered.
- The BAM TSS and the TSS West of the Hanish Islands.
- A two-way route directly connecting the IRTC and the BAM TSS.

It is recommended that ships use the MSTC to benefit from the military presence and surveillance.

Joint War Committee listed area

The insurance community may list an area of perceived enhanced risk in the region. Ships entering the area would need to notify their insurers and additional insurance premiums may apply. The Joint War Committee (JWC) comprises underwriting representatives from both Lloyd's and the International Underwriting Association representing the interests of those who write marine hull war business in the London market. The geographic limits of the JWC listed area can be found on their website: **www.lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar**.

The threat

As well as piracy, regional instability has introduced new security threats including the use of:

- Anti-ship missiles.
- Sea mines.
- Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED).

Piracy

Pirates operate in Pirate Action Groups (PAG) who operate several different boat configurations, typically using small high speed (up to 25 knots) open boats or skiffs.

PAG boat configurations include:

- Skiffs only.
- Open whalers carrying significant quantities of fuel and often towing one or more attack skiffs.
- Motherships, which include merchant ships and fishing vessels but, more commonly, dhows.

Where motherships are used the crew are often held onboard as hostages. Motherships are used to carry pirates, stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable pirates to operate over a much larger area and are significantly less affected by the weather. Attack skiffs are often towed behind motherships. Where the size of the mothership allows, skiffs may be carried onboard and camouflaged.

Pirates may use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) to intimidate Masters of ships to reduce speed or stop to allow them to board. The bridge and accommodation tend to be the main targets for these weapons.

Pirates use long lightweight ladders, knotted climbing ropes or long hooked poles to climb up the side of the ship. Once onboard they will make their way to the bridge to try to take control of the ship. When on the bridge they will demand the ship slows/stops to enable other pirates to board.

Attacks can take place at any time – day or night – however experience shows attacks at dawn and dusk are more likely.

The intent of Somali pirates is to hijack the ship and hold the crew for ransom. The usual practice is to keep the crew onboard as negotiations progress, keeping both the crew and the ship together. Seafarers have occasionally been separated by nationality and taken ashore. It is in the interests of the pirates to keep their captives alive, although cases of intimidation and torture have occurred.

Anti-ship missiles

Anti-ship missiles are long range, accurate and powerful weapons and have been used against military ships in the region. Their use against merchant ships associated with regional conflict cannot be discounted. Other ships may be hit if the missile controller targets the wrong ship or the missile homes in on an unintended target.

Sea mines

Sea mines have been used to deter and deny access to key ports in Yemen. These mines are usually tethered or anchored but may break free from moorings and drift into shipping lanes. Transiting merchant ships are not a target and it is recommended ships use the MSTC when passing through the area.

Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices

WBIED attacks have been used against warships and merchant ships in the southern Red Sea/BAM/western area of the Gulf of Aden.

Incidents have highlighted attacks by different groups operating in the region:

- WBIED used in the regional conflict have been aimed at harming those associated with the conflict. These boats have been unmanned and operated remotely.
- WBIED used by extremists have been aimed at merchant ships. These boats have been manned.

An attack involving a WBIED is likely to involve one or more speed boats operated by a number of individuals approaching and firing both small arms and RPGs. Masters should recognise the intent of these attacks is to cause damage and not necessarily to board the ship. Mitigation measures to prevent the speed boat making contact with the ship's hull are limited.

Section 3
Threat and risk assessment

Threat assessment

The threat assessment must include all regional security threats.

As part of every ship risk assessment prior to transit through the HRA the latest military threat advice must be obtained from UKMTO **www.ukmto.org** and threat assessments from MSCHOA **www.mschoa.org** (see annex A).

A **threat** is formed of capability, intent and opportunity.

Capability means attackers have the physical means to conduct an attack. Intent is demonstrated by continued attacks. Opportunity is what is mitigated by the company, ship and crew through application of the measures described in this guidance. In addition to the information provided in this guidance, supplementary information about the characteristics of the threat, specific or new tactics, and regional background factors may be sought from regional reporting centres and organisations as listed in annex A.

If one side of the triangle is removed, then risk is minimised. The company/Master cannot influence either capability or intent, therefore BMP measures focus on minimising the opportunity.

Risk assessment

Risk assessment is an integral part of voyage planning within a safety management system. The risk assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery, which will mean combining statutory regulations with supplementary measures. Companies should also take account of these measures for ships transiting the VRA even if they do not enter the HRA.

Further guidance on risk assessments can be found in the *Global Counter Piracy Guidance* at **www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org**.

The risk assessment must consider but may not be limited to:

- Requirements of the Flag State, company, charterers and insurers.
- The threat assessment and geographical areas of increased risk.
- Background factors shaping the situation, e.g. traffic patterns and local patterns of life, including fishing vessel activity.
- Cooperation with military. An understanding of presence should be obtained from UKMTO.
- The embarkation of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP).
- The ship's characteristics, vulnerabilities and inherent capabilities, including citadel and/ or safe muster points to withstand the threat (freeboard, speed, general arrangement, etc.).
- The ship's and company's procedures (drills, watch rosters, chain of command, decision making processes, etc.).

All voyages in this region require thorough advanced planning using all available information. The maritime threats are dynamic, and it is therefore essential that a detailed threat and risk assessment is completed for each voyage and activity within the region.

Planning

Company planning

Together with the following, the output of the risk assessment will help develop the ship's voyage plan:

- Regular review of the threat and risk assessments. Plans should be updated as necessary.
- Review of the Ship Security Assessment (SSA), Ship Security Plan (SSP) and Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP).
- Guidance to the Master about the recommended route, updated plans and requirements for group transits and national convoys.
- Company mandated Ship Protection Measures (SPM).
- Due diligence of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) for the possible use of PCASP.
- Companies should consider the placement of hidden position transmitting devices as one of the first actions of hijackers is to disable all visible communication and tracking devices and aerials.
- Review of company manning requirements. Consider disembarking of non-essential crew.
- Crew training plans.

Information security

To avoid critical voyage information falling into the wrong hands the following is advised:

- Communications with external parties should be kept to a minimum, with close attention paid to organising rendezvous points and waiting positions.
- Email correspondence to agents, charterers and chandlers should be controlled and information within the email kept concise, containing the minimum that is contractually required.

Ship Master's Planning

<div style="background-color:red; color:white; text-align:center;">

Security is a key part of any voyage plan.

</div>

Prior to entering the Voluntary Reporting Area

- Obtain the latest threat information.
- Check the latest NAVAREA warnings and alerts.
- Implement VRA/MSCHOA vessel registration and reporting requirements as highlighted in section 6 and annexes D and E.
- If used, confirm PCASP embarkation plan.
- Confirm propulsion can operate at full speed.

Prior to entering the High Risk Area

- Implement security measures in accordance with the SSP.

Brief crew and conduct drills

The crew should be fully briefed on the preparations and drills should be conducted with the SPM in place. The plan should be reviewed and all crew briefed on their duties, including familiarity with the alarm that signals an attack, an all-clear situation and the appropriate response to each. The drills should test:

- The SPM, including testing the security of all access points.
- Lock down conditions, including crew safety considerations.
- The bridge team's security knowledge.
- The crew's understanding of any different actions required in the event of a pirate attack compared to other types of attack.

Other considerations

- Prepare and test an emergency communication plan. Masters are advised to prepare an emergency communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact numbers (see annex A) and prepared messages, which should be at hand or permanently displayed near all external communications stations including safe muster point and/or the citadel. Communication devices and the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) should be tested.
- Define the ship's Automatic Identification System (AIS) policy. It is recommended that AIS should remain switched on throughout passages through passages through the VRA and HRA, to ensure militaries can track the ship, but restrict data to ship's identity, position, course, speed, navigational status and safety related information.
- Reschedule planned maintenance on voyage critical equipment for transit of an HRA.

On entering the High Risk Area

- Submit ship reports as highlighted in section 6 and annexes D and E.
- Monitor latest threat information.
- Ensure all access points are limited and controlled.
- Avoid drifting, waiting, anchoring and slow steaming, particularly in the MSTC.
- Minimise use of VHF and use email or a secure satellite telephone instead. Where possible only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF, bearing in mind that imposters are possible.

Ship Protection Measures

This section highlights proven SPM that provide layered protection. The BMP is based on regional experience of attacks and will continue to evolve as methods change.

The implementation of SPM will be identified during the voyage planning process. Companies may wish to consider making further alterations to the ship beyond the scope of this BMP, and/or providing additional equipment and/or personnel as a means of further reducing the risk of attack.

Primary layer of defence
- Good look out/vigilance.
- Razor wire.
- Manoeuvring.
- Speed/freeboard.
- PCASP.

Secondary layer of defence
- Door hardening.
- Gate/grate.
- Motion sensor/CCTV.

Last layer of defence
- Internal door hardening.
- Citadel/safe muster point.
- Communication.

Watch keeping and enhanced vigilance

The Master should implement the following actions to assist in raising vigilance on board.

- Provide additional, fully-briefed lookouts.
- Maintain an all-round lookout from an elevated position.
- Consider shorter rotation of the watch period to maximise alertness of the lookouts.
- Maintain sufficient binoculars for the enhanced bridge team, preferably anti-glare.
- Consider the use of thermal imagery optics and night vision aids as they provide a reliable all-weather, day and night surveillance capability.
- Maintain a careful radar watch and monitor all navigational warnings and communications, particularly VHF and GMDSS alerts.
- Consider placing well-constructed dummies at strategic locations around the ship to give the impression of greater numbers of crew on watch.

- Consider using CCTV and fixed search lights for better monitoring. Fixed search lights can deter approaches from the stern.
- Mount anti-piracy mirrors on the bridge wings to make looking aft easier.

<div style="background:red">

An effective lookout is the most effective method of ship protection. It can help identify a suspicious approach or attack early on, which allows defences to be deployed.

</div>

Manoeuvring

The Master and officers should practice manoeuvring the ship to ensure familiarity with the ship's handling characteristics. The Master should also practice avoidance manoeuvres while maintaining the best possible speed. Experience has shown that such action can defeat even a lengthy and determined attack as creation of hydrostatic pressure can have a better defensive impact than speed.

<div style="background:red">

Avoidance manoeuvres should only be practiced when it is safe to do so.

</div>

Alarms

The ship's alarms inform the ship's crew that an attack is underway and warn the attacker that the ship is aware and is reacting. In addition, continuous sounding of the ship's whistle may distract the attackers.

It is important that:

- The alarms are distinctive to avoid confusion.
- Crew members are familiar with each alarm, especially those warning of an attack and indicating 'all clear'.
- All alarms are backed up by an announcement over the accommodation and deck PA system, where fitted.
- Drills are carried out to ensure that the alarm is heard throughout the ship. The drill will confirm the time necessary for all crew to move to a position of safety.

Physical barriers

Physical barriers are intended to make it as difficult as possible for attackers to gain access to ships by increasing the difficulty of the climb for those trying to illegally board. When planning the placement of barriers special consideration should be given to ships with sunken poop decks.

Razor wire

Also known as barbed tape. It creates an effective barrier if properly rigged and secured. The quality of razor wire varies considerably and lower quality razor wire is less effective. The following is recommended:

- Use a high tensile concertina razor wire with coil diameters of 730mm or 980mm. This is difficult to cut with hand tools.
- Use a double roll. If this is not possible, place a single high-quality roll outboard of the ship's structure.
- Secure razor wire to the ship properly, to prevent attackers pulling the wire off. For example, attach at least every third wire ring to ship's railings and rig a steel cable through its core.
- Use personal protective equipment and wire hooks to move and install razor wire.
- Obtain razor wire in short sections, e.g. 10m, so that it is easier and safer to move.
- Keep razor wire clear of mooring fairleads when at terminals so that it does not interfere with mooring operations.

Other physical barriers

Other barriers have proven effective – from hanging swinging obstacles over the gunnels to specifically designed overhanging protection that prevents illegal boarding by climbing over the ship's rails.

Water spray and foam monitors

- The use of water spray and/or foam monitors is effective in deterring or delaying any attempt to illegally board a ship. The use of water can make it difficult for an unauthorised boat to remain alongside and makes it significantly more difficult to climb aboard.

- It is recommended hoses and foam monitors (delivering water) are fixed in position to cover likely access routes and are remotely operated. Manual activation is not recommended as this may place the operator in an exposed position.

- Improved water coverage may be achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode and using baffle plates fixed a short distance in front of the nozzle.

- Water cannons deliver water in a vertical sweeping arc and protect a greater part of the hull.

- Water spray rails with spray nozzles produce a water curtain covering larger areas.

- Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a ship's standard fire fighting equipment stock. Foam is disorientating and very slippery.

- The use of all available fire and general service pumps may be required to ensure all defences operate efficiently.

- Additional power may be required when using pumps; the supporting systems should be ready for immediate use.

- Practice, observation and drills are required to ensure the equipment provides effective coverage of vulnerable areas.

Enhanced bridge protection

The bridge is usually the focal point of an attack. In some situations, attackers direct their weapon fire at the bridge to intimidate the ship's crew to slow or stop the ship. If pirates board the ship, they usually make for the bridge to enable them to take control.

The following enhancements may be considered:

- Bridge windows are laminated but further protection against flying glass can be provided by the application of blast resistant film.
- Fabricated metal (steel/aluminium) plates for the side and rear bridge windows and the bridge wing door windows, which can be quickly secured in place in the event of an attack can greatly reduce the risk of injury from fragmentation.
- Chain link fencing can be used to reduce the effects of an RPG.
- Sandbags can provide additional protection on the bridge wings. They should be regularly checked to ensure that they have not degraded.

Control of access to accommodation and machinery spaces

It is important to control access routes to the accommodation and machinery spaces to deter or delay entry. Effort must be directed at denying access to these spaces.

- Escape routes must remain accessible to seafarers in the event of an emergency.
- Where the door or hatch is located on an escape route from a manned compartment, it is essential it can be opened from the inside. Where the door or hatch is locked it is essential a means of opening the door from the inside is available.

- Doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces should be properly secured to prevent them being opened from the outside.

- Once doors and hatches are secured, a designated and limited number are used for security patrols and routine access. The use of these doors or hatches should be controlled by the Officer of the Watch.
- Block external stairs or remove ladders on the accommodation block to prevent use and to restrict external access to the bridge.
- Doors and hatches that must be closed for watertight integrity should be fully dogged down in addition to any locks. Where possible, additional securing mechanisms, such as wire strops, may be used.
- Removable barriers should be used around pilot boarding points so that a ship does not need to de-rig large areas prior to arrival at ports.
- Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The fitting of steel bars to portholes and windows will prevent this.
- Procedures for controlling access to accommodation, machinery spaces and store rooms should be briefed to the crew.
- The attackers must be denied access to ship propulsion.

Safe muster points and/or citadels

The company risk assessment and planning process should identify the location of a safe muster point and/or a citadel within a ship.

Safe muster points

A safe muster point is a designated area chosen to provide maximum physical protection to the crew and will be identified during the planning process.

If the threat assessment identifies risks that may result in a breach of hull on or below the waterline then a safe muster point above the waterline must be identified. In many ships, the central stairway may provide a safe location as it is protected by the accommodation block and is above the waterline.

To minimise the effect of an explosion, consideration should be given to the likely path of the blast. The safe muster point should be selected with this in mind.

Citadels

A citadel is a designated area where, in the event of imminent boarding, all crew may seek protection. A citadel is designed and constructed to resist forced entry. The use of a citadel cannot guarantee a military or law enforcement response.

Well-constructed citadels with reliable communications (ideally satellite phone and VHF) must be supplied with food, water and sanitation. Control of propulsion and steering can offer effective protection during an attack. If citadels are used, they must complement, not replace, all other SPM.

The use of the citadel must be drilled and the SSP should define the conditions and supporting logistics for its use.

It is important to note that military forces are likely to apply the following criteria before boarding a ship:

- All the crew must be accounted for and confirmed in the citadel.
- Two-way communication with the citadel.

The Master should decide when to use the citadel.

Other measures

Closed circuit television

Once an attack is underway it may be difficult to assess whether the attackers have gained access to the ship. The use of CCTV coverage allows a degree of monitoring of the progress of the attack from a less exposed position. Some companies can monitor and record the CCTV from ashore, which will be of value when provided to the military. The following should be considered:

- CCTV cameras for coverage of vulnerable areas, particularly the poop deck and bridge.
- CCTV monitors located on the bridge and at the safe muster point/citadel.
- CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack and should be retained.

Lighting

Lighting is important and the following is recommended:

- Weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing lighting on the poop deck to demonstrate awareness.
- If fitted, search lights ready for immediate use.
- Once attackers have been identified or an attack commences, over side lighting, if fitted, should be switched on. This will dazzle the attackers and help the ship's crew to see them.
- At night, only navigation lights should be exhibited.
- Navigation lights should not be switched off at night as this a contravention of international regulations and the risk of collision is higher than that of being attacked.
- At anchor, deck lights should be left on as well-lit ships are less vulnerable to attack.
- The ability to turn off all internal accommodation lights to deter pirates from entering or disorientate those who may already have entered.

Deny the use of ship's tools and equipment

It is important to secure ship's tools or equipment that may be used to gain entry to the ship. Tools and equipment that may be of use to attackers should be stored in a secure location.

Protection of equipment stored on the upper deck

- Consideration should be given to providing ballistic protection to protect gas cylinders or containers of flammable liquids.
- Excess gas cylinders should be stored in a secure location or, if possible, landed prior to transit.

Private Maritime Security Companies

This section provides guidance on the employment of PMSCs. PMSCs may offer armed or unarmed services. Further guidance on the use of armed services (PCASP) is given below.

BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of PMSCs onboard merchant ships; this is a decision taken by individual ship operators where permitted by the ship's Flag State and any littoral states. However, the use of experienced and competent unarmed PMSCs can be a valuable protective measure, particularly where there may be the requirement to interface and coordinate with local law enforcement agencies, naval forces and coast guards.

Any decision to engage the services of a PMSC should consider:

- The current threat and risk environment.
- The output of the company risk assessment.
- Voyage plan requirements.
- Ship speed.
- Freeboard.
- Type of operations, e.g. seismic survey or cable laying.
- Levels of protection provided by navies, coastguards and maritime police.

Some Flag States do not allow the deployment of PMSC.

It is recommended that shipping companies only employ PMSCs who are accredited to the current ISO 28007-1:2015 *Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) providing privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board ships*.

A PMSC contract must:

- Be between the technical manager and the PMSC.
- Not prejudice the ship's insurance cover arrangements.
- Ensure the PMSC has insurance policies that are current and compliant with the requirements of the contract.
- Clearly identify the procedure for the use of force.
- Confirm the Master's overriding authority.

Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel

Any decision to engage the services of PCASP should consider the guidance above for PMSC as well as the following.

BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of PCASP onboard merchant ships; this is a decision taken by individual ship operators where permitted by the ship's Flag State and any littoral states.

> **Companies must check the credentials and licenses/permits of the PMSC, and where appropriate the PCASP, to ensure they have been issued by an appropriate authority and are operating legally against identified threats.**

Some Flag States do not allow the deployment of PCASP. Some Flag States provide military Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) instead of PCASP. A VPD may be provided by another State, subject to Flag State approval. In some cases, the deployment of either PCASP or VPDs must be reported and acknowledged by the Flag State and reported when entering the VRA (see section 6 and annexes D and E).

Master's overriding authority

If private security contractors are embarked, there must be a clear understanding of the overriding authority of the Master.

The Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) under which the PCASP operate must be acceptable to the Flag State and the company.

The Master and PCASP should:

- Clearly understand and acknowledge the RUF as outlined in the contract.
- Have documentation authorising the carriage of weapons and ammunition.
- Ensure all incidents involving the use of weapons and armed force are reported at the earliest instance to the Flag State and the Chief Security Officer (CSO).

The PCASP must:

- Act in accordance with the agreed RUF, which should provide for a graduated, reasonable, proportionate and demonstrably necessary escalation in the application of force in defence of crew on the ship.

> **PCASP should only be used as an additional layer of mitigation and protections and not as an alternative to other measures. The decision to carry PCASP is an output of the company risk assessment and a ship that traverses the HRA without PCASP on board can be considered in full compliance with the BMP. The ship's crew must not handle or use firearms.**

Reporting

All ships are strongly encouraged to inform military organisations of their movement as this is essential to improve military situational awareness and their ability to respond. Once ships have commenced their passage it is important this reporting continues and the guidelines in this section and annexes C, D and E are adopted to ensure common understanding. The two principal military organisations to contact are the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) and Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA).

UKMTO

UKMTO acts as the primary point of contact for merchant ships and their CSOs, providing liaison with military forces in the region. UKMTO administers the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send regular reports. These include:

1.   Initial report (upon entering the VRA).
2.   Daily reports (update on ship's position, course and speed).
3.   Final reports (upon departure from VRA or arrival in port).
4.   Reports of suspicious/irregular activity (when necessary).

UKMTO is able to communicate with ships and CSOs directly, in order to disseminate Warnings and Advisories of incidents within the region:

- Warnings: Simple messages describing that an incident has occurred in a Lat/Long and with a time. This is normally accompanied by direct UKMTO-to-ship telephone calls to all ships within a nominated radius of the incident to give ships the earliest possible alert.
- Advisories: This is the next tier of alerts to ships, normally of sightings/reports that are relevant within the region.

UKMTO offers regular information to ships on its website **www.ukmto.org** and in a weekly report summarising the previous week's activity. UKMTO is also able to offer Masters and CSOs the opportunity to conduct drills and exercises to support their passage planning in the region. Companies that are interested can contact UKMTO +44(0)2392 222060 or watchkeepers@ukmto.org.

Ships and their operators should complete both UKMTO vessel position reporting forms and register with MSCHOA.

MSCHOA

The MSCHOA is the planning and coordination centre for the EU Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR). MSCHOA encourages companies to register their ships' movements before entering the HRA and if participating in the group transit system via their website **www.mschoa.org**.

When departing the VRA, ships should be aware of adjacent regional reporting requirements, e.g.: NATO Shipping Centre (Mediterranean – Chart Q6010) and ReCAAP Information Sharing Center/Singapore Information Fusion Center (SE Asia – Chart Q6012).

EU NAVFOR and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) produce Industry Releasable Threat Assessments (IRTAs) to aid risk management for companies. The threat assessments use military knowledge and intelligence to present a common understanding of the threats and trends in the region. The IRTAs are complimented by Industry Releasable Threat Bulletins (IRTBs), which cover specific events. These documents are an important resource and should be considered as part of the threat and risk assessment process.

The role of the seafarer in improving maritime safety and security in the region

Although some of the maritime threats and crimes committed do not directly endanger seafarers there is the opportunity for them to contribute to maritime security.

Experience has shown that maritime security cannot be improved by the actions of law enforcement agencies and militaries alone; seafarers operating in the region can help. This is more important in the seas off the coast of Somalia and Yemen where navies, coastguards and law enforcement agencies have limited resources.

Masters are encouraged to report suspicious activity and provide as much detail as possible. If it is possible to do so without compromising safety, photographs, video and radar plot data of suspicious activity are of enormous value to the responsible authorities. If there is any doubt as to whether the activity is suspicious, ships are encouraged to report.

Reporting suspicious activity to UKMTO

UKMTO can advise on the types of activity of interest to the regional maritime community. A guide to help identify suspicious activity is in annex C and the suspicious/irregular activity report is in annex D. Often, seafarers do not report suspicious activity as they may be concerned observations could lead to further investigations by Port States and possible delay to the ship. UKMTO will forward information received in an anonymised form to the most appropriate agency empowered to act. While suspicious activity may appear inconsequential, when added to other reports it may be extremely valuable.

Section 7
Ships under attack

General

A ship may come under attack with little or no warning. Effective lookouts, both visual and radar, will help to ensure early detection.

Piracy attack

Pirates carrying weapons do not usually open fire until they are very close to the ship, e.g. within two cables.

Use whatever time available, no matter how short, to activate any additional protective measures and plans. This will make it clear to the attackers that they have been seen, the ship is prepared and will resist attempts to board.

> **In the event of a suspicious approach, or if in any doubt, call UKMTO without delay.**

Approach stage

Effective lookouts may aid in identifying the nature of the attack, the threat profile of a piracy or other attack may initially look similar and it will not be until the attackers are close that the nature of the attack becomes apparent. In all cases, the following steps should be taken:

- If not already at full speed, increase to maximum to open the distance.
- Steer a straight course to maintain a maximum speed.
- Initiate the ship's emergency procedures.
- Activate the emergency communication plan.
- Sound the emergency alarm and make an attack announcement, in accordance with the ship's emergency communication plan.
- Make a mayday call on VHF Ch. 16. Send a distress message via the Digital Selective Calling (DSC) system and Inmarsat-C, as applicable.
- Activate the SSAS.
- Report the attack immediately to UKMTO (+44 2392 222060) by telephone.
- Ensure the AIS is switched on.

- Activate water spray.
- Ensure that all external doors and, where possible, internal public rooms and cabins are fully secured.
- All crew not required on the bridge or in the engine room should muster at the safe muster point or citadel as instructed by the Master.
- When sea conditions allow, consider altering course to increase an approaching skiff's exposure to wind/waves.
- Sound the ship's whistle/foghorn continuously to demonstrate to any potential attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it.
- Check Vessel Data Recorder (VDR) is recording.
- PCASP, if present, will take agreed actions to warn off attackers.

Attack stage

As the attackers get close the following steps should be taken:

- Reconfirm all ship's crew are in the safe muster point or citadel as instructed by the Master.
- Ensure the SSAS has been activated.
- If not actioned, report the attack immediately to **UKMTO (+44 2392 222060)** by telephone.
- As the attackers close in on the ship, Masters should commence small alterations of helm whilst maintaining speed to deter skiffs from lying alongside the ship in preparation for a boarding attempt. These manoeuvres will create additional wash to impede the operation of the skiffs.
- Large amounts of helm are not recommended, as these are likely to significantly reduce a ship's speed.
- Check VDR data is being saved.
- PCASP, if present, will conduct themselves as governed by the RUF.

Actions on illegal boarding

If the ship is illegally boarded the following actions should be taken:

- Take all way off the ship and then stop the engines.
- All remaining crew members to proceed to the citadel or safe muster point locking all internal doors on route.
- PCASP, if present, will follow procedures agreed with company and Master.
- Ensure all crew are present in the citadel or safe muster point. This includes the Master, bridge team and PCASP.

- Establish communications from the citadel with UKMTO and your company and confirm all crew are accounted for and in the citadel or safe muster point.
- Stay in the citadel until conditions force you to leave or advised by the military.
- If any member of the crew is captured it should be considered that the pirates have full control of the ship.

If control of the ship is lost

- All movement should be calm, slow and very deliberate. Crew members should keep their hands visible always and comply fully. This will greatly reduce the risk of violence.

Experience has shown that the pirates will be aggressive, highly agitated and possibly under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

DO be patient.

DO keep mentally active/occupied.

DO keep track of time.

DO reduce stress where possible by remaining physically active.

DO remain calm and retain dignity.

DO be positive (remember, authorities are working tirelessly to release you).

DO remember to leave any CCTV or audio recording devices running.

DO exactly what the attackers ask and comply with their instruction.

DO NOT take photographs.

DO NOT attempt to engage attackers.

DO NOT make movements which could be misinterpreted as being aggressive.

DO NOT be confrontational.

DO NOT resist.

Hijack – hostage situation

The model of pirate action off Somalia is to hijack the ship and hold the crew for ransom. It should be remembered it is in the interests of the pirates to keep the ship and crew safe.

Each company or organisation should have a policy in place to cover the eventualities of kidnap and ransom. The following principles serve as guidelines to surviving a kidnapping.

DO remain calm and maintain self-control.

DO be humble and respectful to the pirates.

DO look out for your colleagues' well-being.

DO stay together as a team, where possible.

DO accept the new pirate leadership.

DO maintain the hierarchy of rank.

DO try to establish normal communication with the pirates.

DO maintain personal hygiene.

DO save water and essentials.

DO be positive – many people are working to release you.

DO be patient and maintain routines (including your spiritual needs, as permitted by pirates).

DO try to keep your breathing regular.

DO meditate and keep mentally active.

DO respect religion: yours, your colleagues' and the pirates'.

DO NOT offer resistance.

DO NOT argue with pirates or your colleagues.

DO NOT take photographs.

DO NOT hide valuables.

DO NOT react emotionally.

DO NOT take drugs or alcohol.

DO NOT bargain with pirates for personal privileges.

In the event of military intervention

Brief and prepare the ship's crew to cooperate fully during any military action onboard and instruct crew as follows.

DO keep low to the deck and cover head with both hands.

DO keep hands visible.

DO be prepared to be challenged on your identity.

DO cooperate fully with military forces.

DO NOT make movements that could be interpreted as aggressive.

DO NOT take photographs.

DO NOT get involved in activity with military forces unless specifically instructed to.

Attack from other threats

- **Anti-ship missiles** In the event or warning of a missile attack military advice should be followed. If no warning is received there will be no time to take any mitigations beyond a PA warning to the crew if a missile is spotted. It is unlikely merchant ships will be the intended target; Masters should be aware of the ship plot in their immediate vicinity and, if sea room allows, keep clear of naval and associated ships.

- **Sea mines** Ships should avoid all published or identified mine danger areas and maintain close liaison with military authorities. If operating close to mine danger areas, Masters should be aware tethered mines may break free and drift into shipping lanes. Ships should manoeuvre clear of floating objects and the forward area of the ship should be kept clear of crew. Effective lookouts are essential. Specific advice on self protective measures when operating in mine danger areas can be obtained from UKMTO.

- **WBIED attack** In the early stages of the attack it may not be possible to differentiate between a piracy or WBIED attack. Initial actions as highlighted in this guidance for the approach stage of a piracy attack should be followed. Military threat assessments may indicate areas where one type of attack is more likely than another. A speed boat with multiple people onboard is unlikely to be a WBIED as these are usually unmanned or have a solitary occupant.

WBIED attacks may result in a breach of the ship's hull. The use of the safe muster point is recommended before entering a citadel located below the waterline.

Courtesy of the US Naval Institute

If a WBIED is anticipated, the time to react is very short. The figure below gives an example of possible reaction times.

Good look out is essential.
All crew and PCASP alerted.
Attempt to communicate with approaching boat.
If time permits send DISTRESS – Call UKMTO.

1nm

Be at full speed.
PCASP likely to present warnings.

1500m

PCASP will act in accordance with the RUF.
Prepare to move crew to a safe muster point above the waterline.

1000m

Crew move to safe muster point.

500m

25 knots   150 secs   75 secs

120 secs

240 secs

15 knots

The threat and risk assessment will identify areas where these threats occur which, if successful, may result in an explosion (commonly referred to as a blast). The Master should communicate to the crew prior to entering a threat area what position to take if a blast threat is detected. The Master may consider telling the crew to:

- Lie flat on the deck, as this may minimise exposure and may reduce the impact on the body from the blast.
- Adopt a brace position (arms/legs bent, hands holding onto something solid and feet firmly planted on the deck) to protect personnel from shock waves.
- Move away from a particular area, such as the port side, starboard side, poop deck or engine room.

Post a WBIED attack
- Ensure all crew and PCASP are accounted for.
- Send distress signal.
- Survey area where the blast occurred.
- Implement damage control.
- Call CSO and UKMTO.

Post incident actions and reporting

The period following an attack will be difficult as companies, Master and crew recover from the ordeal. It is important that seafarers receive timely and proper medical assessments, both physical and mental, and care following an attack or hostage situation. Companies should have emergency management plans in place to manage the effects from an attack from any of the identified threats on one of their ships. These plans should include the management of a long, drawn-out hostage negotiation situation, including support for the families of the kidnapped crew.

To give the investigating authorities the best chance of apprehending the perpetrators, it is important that evidence is preserved in the correct manner. Companies, Masters and crew should refer to IMO *Guidelines on Preservation and Collection of Evidence* A28/ Res. 1091 and other industry guidance.

Following any attack or suspicious activity, and after initial reporting of the event, it is vital that a detailed report is completed. A copy of the report should be sent to the company, the Flag State and appropriate authorities. It is important that any report is detailed and comprehensive. This will assist with full analysis and trends in threat activity.

Without supporting evidence, including witness statements from those affected by the incident, suspects are unlikely to be prosecuted.

Protection of evidence

The collection and protection of evidence is critical.

The Master and crew can protect a crime scene until the nominated law enforcement agency arrives by following these basic principles:

- Preserve the crime scene and all evidence if possible.
- Avoid contaminating or interfering with all possible evidence – if in doubt, do not touch and leave items in place.
- Do not clean up the area, including hosing it down. Do not throw anything away, no matter how unimportant it may seem.
- Take initial statements from the crew.
- Take photographs of the crime scene from multiple viewpoints.
- Protect VDR for future evidence.
- Make a list of items taken (e.g. mobile phones with numbers).
- Facilitate access to the crime scene and relevant documentation for law enforcement authorities.
- Make crew available for interview by law enforcement authorities.

Investigation

Thorough investigation using all available evidence is critical.

The quality of the evidence provided and the availability of the crew to testify will significantly help any investigation or prosecution that follows.

Following any attack or incident the investigating authority will be determined by external factors including:

- Flag State.
- Ownership.
- Crew nationality.

Seafarers should always be treated with respect and as victims of crime.

The lead law enforcement agency will talk to the Master and crew to understand the sequence and circumstances of the event.

In a post hostage situation, law enforcement authorities may ask to conduct post-release crew debriefs and to collect evidence for investigations and prosecutions following captivity.

Advice

INTERPOL has a secure website to provide support to ship operators who have had their ships hijacked. INTERPOL's Maritime Task Force can assist in taking the appropriate steps to preserve the integrity of the evidence left behind at the crime scene. INTERPOL has a Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC) that supports any of the 188-member countries faced with a crisis or requiring urgent operational assistance. The CCC operates in all four of INTERPOL's official languages (English, French, Spanish and Arabic) and is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL within three days of a hijacking of their ship.

INTERPOL may also be consulted to discuss the recommended practices for the preservation of evidence that could be useful to law enforcement agents pursuing an investigation. Contact details are: email os-ccc@interpol.int; telephone +33 472 44 7676.

Seafarer welfare

Seafarers and their families often have difficulty in expressing the need for assistance or even recognising that they need assistance following exposure to a security threat. The company should monitor the health, both physical and mental, of those exposed to piracy and other maritime security threats and if necessary provide independent support and other assistance, as may be appropriate. There is a range of humanitarian programmes aimed at assisting seafarers and their families effected by piracy or maritime crime, including the International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network and The Mission to Seafarers. See **www.seafarerswelfare.org** and **www.missiontoseafarers.org**.

Annex A
Contact details

Emergency contacts

United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations

Email	watchkeepers@ukmto.org
Telephone (24hrs)	+44 2392 222060
Website	www.ukmto.org

Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa

Email	postmaster@mschoa.org
Telephone	+44 1923 958545
	+44 1923 958700
Fax	+44 1923 958520
Website	www.mschoa.org

US Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping

Email	cusnc.ncags_bw@me.navy.mil
Telephone (24hrs)	+973 3904 9583
Telephone (office)	+973 1785 1023

Useful contacts

International Maritime Bureau (IMB)

Email	piracy@icc-ccs.org
Telephone	+60 3 2031 0014
Fax	+60 3 2078 5769
Telex	MA34199 IMBPC1
Website	www.icc-ccs.org

INTERPOL

Email	os-ccc@interpol.int
Telephone (24hrs)	+33 472 44 76 76
Website	www.interpol.int

Adjacent regional reporting centres

Mediterranean

NATO Shipping Centre

Email	info@shipping.nato.int
Telephone (24hrs)	+44 1923 956574
Fax	+44 1923 956575
Website	www.shipping.nato.int

South East Asia

ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre

Email	info@recaap.org
Telephone	+65 6376 3063
Fax No	+65 6376 3066

Singapore Information Fusion Centre

Email	ifc_do@defence.gov.sg
Telephone	+65 9626 8965 (24/7)
	+65 6594 5728
Fax No	+65 6594 5734

Annex B
Maritime security charts

Maritime security charts contain safety-critical information to assist bridge crews in the planning of safe passages through high risk areas. All information has been gathered by the UKHO through work with NATO and other government organisations, ensuring each chart has the most accurate, up-to-date and verified information available.

Each maritime security chart includes:

- Information about dangers to the security of navigation including piracy, terrorism, embargoes, mine warfare, exclusion zones, blockades and illegal fishing. This information, when used alongside official navigational charts, can help to ensure the safety of ships, crew and cargo.
- General security advice, self-protective measures, security procedures and regional contacts, as well as routeing and reporting requirements implemented by military or security forces.

Annex C
Common understanding

It is important to have a common understanding when reporting attacks and suspicious activity.

The following are guidelines to assist in assessing what is an attack or what constitutes suspicious activity.

Attacks

- The use of violence against the ship, its crew or cargo, or any attempt to use violence.
- Unauthorised attempts to board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are pirates or other unauthorised persons.
- If weapons or RPGs are fired.
- Attempts to place a WBIED against the hull.
- Sighting of missile firing.
- An actual boarding, whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
- Attempts to overcome the SPM using:
    - Ladders.
    - Grappling hooks.
    - Weapons deliberately used against or at the ship.

Suspicious activity

- The number of crew onboard relative to its size.
- The Closest Point of Approach.
- The existence of unusual and non-fishing equipment onboard, e.g. ladders, climbing hooks or large amounts of fuel.
- One vessel towing multiple skiffs or has skiffs onboard.
- The type of vessel is unusual for the current location.
- Small boats operating at high speed.
- If a vessel appears unmanned.
- The vessel is not transmitting on AIS.
- The vessel is not flying a Flag.
- Vessel is flying two or more flags simultaneously.
- Skiffs operating far from the coast.
- Vessels fishing outside of normal fishing zones.
- Windows of vessel covered or blanked out.

- Dhows/skiffs rafted up.
- No lights during hours of darkness.
- Skiffs with two or more outboard motors.
- Dhows/skiffs stopped in the water, no evidence of fishing.
- Vessels loitering East of Socotra, South of the Makran Coast or in the vicinity of Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam, Pemba, Salalah, Ras Fartek or the IRTC.
- Packages hanging outboard of a vessel.
- Excessive communications antennas.

This is not an exhaustive list. Other events, activity and vessels may be deemed suspicious by the Master of a merchant ship having due regard to their own seagoing experiences within the region and information shared amongst the maritime community.

If in doubt, report and contact UKMTO.

Annex D
UKMTO reporting forms

UKMTO vessel position reporting forms

Once a ship has transmitted an initial report on entering the VRA, UKMTO will request daily reports be transmitted. Upon reaching port or upon exiting the VRA, UKMTO will request a final report. The following forms are provided below and are available at **www.ukmto.org**:

- Initial report.
- Daily report.
- Final report.
- Suspicious/irregular activity report.

UKMTO vessel position reporting form - initial report

1	Ship Name
2	Flag
3	IMO Number
4	INMARSAT Telephone Number
5	Time and Position
6	Course
7	Passage Speed
8	Freeboard
9	Cargo
10	Destination and Estimated Time of Arrival
11	Name and contact details of Company Security Officer
12	Nationality of Master and Crew
13	Armed/unarmed security team embarked

UKMTO vessel position reporting form – daily/transit position report

1	Ship Name
2	Ship's Call Sign and IMO Number
3	Time of Report in UTC
4	Ship's Position
5	Ship's Course and Speed
6	Any other important information*
7	ETA point A/B IRTC (if applicable)

Other important information could be change of destination or ETA, number of UK crew on board, etc.

UKMTO vessel position reporting form - final report

1	Ship's name
2	Ship's Call Sign and IMO Number
3	Time of Report in UTC
4	Port or position when leaving the voluntary reporting area

UKMTO suspicious/irregular activity report

1	Ship's name
2	Ship's Call Sign and IMO Number
3	Time of Report in UTC
4	Ship's Position
5	Ship's Course and Speed
6	Sighting of suspicious activity. Time, position, brief description of craft and activity witnessed

Note: Where possible include any imagery to aid military appreciation.

Follow-up report to UKMTO and MSCHOA

Following any attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is provided to UKMTO and MSCHOA. It is helpful to provide a copy of the report to the IMB.

Annex E

Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa reporting forms

MSCHOA vessel registration and incident reporting

Registration with MSCHOA ensures a ship is monitored by military counter piracy forces during its transit of the HRA. In addition, regular threat assessment updates, warnings and the latest self-protection information are made available to shipping companies and Masters who register.

Registration is required within the MSCHOA Vessel Registration Area as highlighted on UKHO Chart Q6099.

The form to 'Register a Vessel's Movements' is available on the MSCHOA website and UKHO Chart Q6099. The following should be noted:

- There are two principal methods to register your ship's movement with MSCHOA.
  - **Online** at **www.mschoa.org** (note you will need to register with MSCHOA for access, this can be done following the register tab on the website).
  - **Offline.** A downloadable form is available from **www.mschoa.org** or it can be requested from **postmaster@mschoa.org**. This form was updated in March 2018 to make offline registration simpler for ships with sporadic internet connectivity to register.

If the above options are not possible a ship can be registered by sending an email with the subject heading **MSCHOA Vessel Registration** to postmaster@mschoa.org with the information in the table below. Items marked with an * are mandatory.

Vessel Details

Ship Name *	Flag State *
IMO Number *	MMSI Number *
Call Sign *	Ship's Master
Primary Email *	Secondary Email
Ship contact number *	Ship contact email *
Owner name	Operator name
Operator address	DPA name
DPA telephone	DPA email

Movement Details

Entry Point to MSCHOA vessel registration area * (78°E/10°S/23°N/Suez/Port)	Entry Date/Time to MSCHOA vessel registration area * (DD/MM/YYYY) (HH) (MM)
Exit Point from MSCHOA vessel registration area * (78°E/10°S/23°N/Suez/Port)	Exit Date/Time to MSCHOA vessel registration area * (DD/MM/YYYY) (HH) (MM)
Do you intend to transit the IRTC?	
ETA to IRTC (times are in UTC/ Zulu time) *	
Direction * (East/West)	
Do you intend to join a group transit?	Do you intend to join a National Convoy?
	Which National Convoy are you joining? *
Crew numbers and nationalities	Draught
Freeboard of lowest accessible deck in Metres(M) *	Planned Transit Speed *
Vessel's Maximum Speed *	Cargo (Crude Oil/Clean Oil/Arms/ Chemicals/ Gas/Passengers/Bulk Cargo/ Containers/Fishing/Ballast/ Others … Please Specify)
	Hazardous cargo
Next Port of Call	Last Port of Call
Number of Armed Security personnel on board?	Nationality of armed security team?

Follow-up report to MSCHOA and UKMTO

Following any attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is provided to UKMTO and MSCHOA. It is also helpful to provide a copy of the report to the IMB.

Incident report; vessel particulars/details

It is recognised that during an incident time may be short and crew will be under a number of pressures and stresses. Those lines marked with an * are those that, in extremis, are the key requirements that must be reported. Without this data responses cannot be planned or mounted and assessments will be incomplete and may be inaccurate.

INCIDENT REPORTING PART ONE – VESSEL DETAILS				
Line			Responses / Inclusions	Format
(a)	(b)			(d)
IDENTITY	1.1	A*	SHIP NAME	PLAIN TEXT
		B*	IMO NUMBER	PLAIN TEXT
		C	FLAG	PLAIN TEXT
		D	CALL SIGN	PLAIN TEXT
		E	OWNER NAME & CONTACT DETAILS	PLAIN TEXT
		F	Company Security Officer / Designated Person Assure CONTACT DETAILS	PLAIN TEXT
CREW / CARGO	1.2	A	CREW NUMBER	PLAIN TEXT
		B	CREW NATIONALITIES	PLAIN TEXT
		C	CAPTAIN / MASTER NATIONALITY	PLAIN TEXT
		D	CARGO	PLAIN TEXT
		E	CARGO SIZE / QUANTITY	PLAIN TEXT
ROUTE / SCHEDULE	1.3	A	LAST PORT OF CALL (LPOC)	PLAIN TEXT
		B	LAST PORT OF CALL DATE	PLAIN TEXT
		C	NEXT PORT OF CALL (NPOC)	PLAIN TEXT
		D	NEXT PORT OF CALL DATE	PLAIN TEXT
		E	SEA DAYS SINCE LAST PORT	PLAIN TEXT

INCIDENT REPORTING PART TWO – INCIDENT DETAILS			
Line		Responses / Inclusions	Format
(a)	(b)		(d)
DETAILS	2.1*	TIME OF REPORT	DTG
	2.2 A*	INCIDENT LOCATION	LAT / LONG
	2.2 B*	SPEED AND HEADING AT TIME OF INCIDENT	PLAIN TEXT
	2.3 A*	INCIDENT START TIME	DTG
	2.3 B*	INCIDENT END TIME	DTG
	2.3 C	WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING EVENT	PLAIN TEXT
INCIDENT	2.4 A*	SIGHTING / APPROACH / COMMUNICATION / ATTACK / BOARDING	SELECT
	2.4 B	AREA(S) OF VESSEL TARGETED	PLAIN TEXT
SUSPECTS	2.5 A*	NUMBER OF SUSPECT CRAFT	NUMBER
	2.5 B	NUMBER OF SUSPECT INDIVIDUALS	NUMBER
	2.5 C	NOT KNOWN / CIVILIAN DRESS / UNIFORMS / MIX	SELECT
	2.5 D	ETHNICITY / LANGUAGES	PLAIN TEXT
WEAPONS	2.6 A*	NONE SEEN / SIGHTED / SHOTS FIRED	SELECT
	2.6 B	PISTOLS / RIFLES / MACHINE GUNS / GRENADE LAUNCHERS	SELECT
LADDERS	2.7 A	NONE SEEN / SUSPECTED / SIGHTED / USED	SELECT
	2.7 B	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION	PLAIN TEXT
CRAFT	2.8 A*	TYPE: WHALER / DHOW / FISHING VESSEL / MERCHANT VESSEL	SELECT
	2.8 B	DESCRIPTION OF VESSEL (COLOUR, NAME, FEATURES)	PLAIN TEXT

YOUR VESSEL	2.9	A*	CITADEL / SECURE AREA	YES / NO
		B*	NO SECURITY TEAM / UNARMED TEAM / ARMED TEAM	SELECT
		C	HEIGHT OF FREEBOARD AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT	PLAIN TEXT
		D	SELF PROTECTION MEASURES IN PLACE BEFORE INCIDENT	PLAIN TEXT
		E	DEFENCE MEASURES EMPLOYED	YES / NO
		F	OTHER	PLAIN TEXT
YOUR RESPONSE	2.10	A*	ALARM SOUNDED	YES / NO
		B*	CREW MUSTERED IN CITADEL	YES / NO
		C*	INCREASED SPEED / EVASIVE MANOEUVRES	SELECT
		D*	DESCRIPTION	SELECT
		E	PAST SHOWED WEAPONS / WARNING SHOTS / AIMED SHOTS / NO PAST	PLAIN TEXT
		F	WAS INCIDENT REPORTED TO AUTHORITIES? IF SO TO WHOM?	PLAIN TEXT
STATUS	2.11	A*	INCIDENT FINISHED / ONGOING	SELECT
		B	INCIDENT ENDED BY SUSPECTS / OWN VESSEL	YES / NO
		C	DETAIL	YES / NO

INCIDENT REPORTING PART THREE – STATUS AND SUPPORT REQUESTS				
Line			Responses / Inclusions	Format
(a)	(b)			(d)
STATUS	3.1	A*	VESSEL SAFE / UNSAFE / UNDER ATTACK / BOARDED	SELECT
		B	VESSEL UNDERWAY / VESSEL STATIC	SELECT
		C*	UNDER OWN POWER / SUPPORTED / WITHOUT POWER	SELECT
		D	NO DAMAGE / MINOR DAMAGE / MAJOR DAMAGE	SELECT
DAMAGE / MEDICAL	3.2	A*	DAMAGE DETAILS	PLAIN TEXT
		B	CREW AT STATIONS / CREW IN CITADEL / CREW OFF SHIP	SELECT
		C	CREW INJURIES	NUMBER
		D	INJURY DETAILS	PLAIN TEXT
		E	CREW FATALITIES	NUMBER
		F	FATALITY DETAILS	PLAIN TEXT
INTENTIONS	3.3	A*	CONTINUE AS PLANNED / RE-ROUTING	SELECT
		B*	REPAIR DAMAGE / ABANDON SHIP / SURRENDER CONTROL	PLAIN TEXT
		C	CURRENT SPEED	PLAIN TEXT
		D	CURRENT HEADING	PLAIN TEXT
		E	OTHER	PLAIN TEXT

IMAGERY	3.4	A	WAS THE INCIDENT RECORDED?	YES / NO
		B	CCTV FOOTAGE / PHOTOGRAPHS	SELECT
		C	IMAGERY ATTACHED (IF AVAILABLE PLEASE ATTACH)	YES / NO
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION	3.5	A	ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH MAY ASSIST?	PLAIN TEXT
		B	PLEASE ATTACH WITH THIS REPORT – A BRIEF DESCRIPTION / FULL REPORT / MASTER – CREW STATEMENT OF THE ATTACK	PLAIN TEXT

Additional guidance for vessels engaged in fishing

This guidance for vessels engaged in fishing has been provided by the following national fishing industry associations:

- **OPAGAC** – Organizacion de Productores Asociados de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores.
- **ANABAC** – Asociacion Nacional de Armadores de Buques Atuneros Congeladores.

Recommendations to vessels in fishing zones

- Non-Somali fishing vessels should avoid operating or transiting within 200nm of the coast of Somalia, irrespective of whether they have been issued with licenses to do so.
- Do not start fishing operations when the radar indicates the presence of unidentified boats.
- If polyester skiffs of a type typically used by pirates are sighted, move away from them at full speed, sailing into the wind and sea to make their navigation more difficult.
- Avoid stopping at night. Be alert and maintain bridge, deck and engine-room watch.
- During fishing operations, when the vessel is more vulnerable, be alert and maintain radar watch to give maximum notice to your crew and the state authorities if an attack is in progress.
- While navigating at night, use only the mandatory navigation and safety lights to prevent the glow of lighting attracting pirates, who are sometimes in boats without radar and are waiting.
- If the vessel is drifting while fishing at night, keep guard at the bridge on deck and in the engine room. Use only mandatory navigation and safety lights.
- The engine must be ready for an immediate start-up.
- Keep away from unidentified ships.
- Use VHF as little as possible to avoid being heard by pirates and to make location more difficult.
- Activate the AIS when maritime patrol aircraft are operating in the area to facilitate identification and tracking.

Identification

- Managers are strongly recommended to register their fishing vessels with MSCHOA for the whole period of activity off the coast of Somalia. This should include communicating a full list of the crewmen on board and their vessels' intentions, if possible.
- Carry out training prior to passage or fishing operations in the area.
- Whenever fishing vessels are equipped with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) devices, their manager should provide MSCHOA with access to VMS data.
- Fishing vessels should always identify themselves upon request from aircraft or ships from any international or national anti-piracy operation.
- Military, merchant and fishing vessels should respond without delay to any identification request made by a fishing vessel being approached (to facilitate early action to make escape possible, especially if the vessel is fishing).

In case of attack

- In case of an attack or sighting a suspicious craft, warn the authorities (UKMTO and MSCHOA) and the rest of the fleet.
- Communicate the contact details of the second Master of the vessel (who is on land) whose knowledge of the vessel could contribute to the success of a military intervention.
- Recommendations **only for Purse Seiners:**
  - Evacuate all crew from the deck and the crow's nest.
  - If pirates have taken control of the vessel and the purse seine is spread out, encourage the pirates to allow the nets to be recovered. If recovery of the purse seine is allowed, follow the instructions for its stowage and explain the functioning of the gear to avoid misunderstanding.

Additional advice for leisure craft, including yachts

Leisure craft should make early contact in advance with the naval/military authorities to determine if the VRA area is safe to transit; regional activity has indicated attacks occur on both large and small vessels. Transit close to areas of conflict should be avoided. Close contact should be maintained with UKMTO throughout any voyage.

See the MSCHOA (**www.mschoa.org**) and the International Sailing Federation (**www.sailing.org**) for the most up-to-date information.

Annex H
Definitions and abbreviations

Definitions

The following definitions to term and categorise attacks and suspicious incidents that are reported from shipping inside the VRA may help. This ensures the consistent identification of patterns and trends.

Armed robbery The Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, highlights armed robbery against ships consists of:

- Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.

- Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.

Attack An attack, as opposed to an approach, is where a ship has been subjected to an aggressive approach by an unidentified craft AND weapons have been discharged.

Hijack A hijack is where attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will. Hijackers will not always have the same objective (armed robbery, cargo theft or kidnapping).

Illegal boarding An illegal boarding is where attackers have boarded a ship but HAVE NOT taken control. Command remains with the Master. The most obvious example of this is the citadel scenario.

Piracy Piracy is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (article 101). However, for the purposes of these BMP, it is important to provide clear, practical, working guidance to the industry to enable accurate and consistent assessment of suspicious activity and piracy attacks.

The following may assist in assessing what is a piracy attack. A piracy attack may include but is not limited to:

- The use of violence against the ship or its personnel, or any attempt to use violence.
- Attempt(s) to illegally board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are pirates.
- An actual boarding whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
- Attempts to overcome the SPM by the use of:
    - Ladders.
    - Grappling hooks.
    - Weapons deliberately used against or at the ship.

Suspicious or aggressive approach Action taken by another craft may be deemed suspicious if any of the following occur (the list is not exhaustive):

- A definite course alteration towards a ship associated with a rapid increase in speed by the suspected craft, which cannot be accounted for by the prevailing conditions.
- Small craft sailing on the same course and speed for an uncommon period and distance, not in keeping with normal fishing or other circumstances prevailing in the area.
- Sudden changes in course towards the ship and aggressive behaviour.

Abbreviations

AIS	Automatic Identification System
BAM	Bab el Mandeb
CMF	Combined Maritime Forces
CSO	Chief Security Officer
DSC	Digital Selective Calling
EU NAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
HRA	High Risk Area
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IRTA	Industry Releasable Threat Assessment
IRTB	Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin
IRTC	Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
JWC	Joint War Committee
MSC	Maritime Safety Committee
MSCHOA	Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa
MSTC	Maritime Security Transit Corridor
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PAG	Pirate Action Group
PCASP	Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
PMSC	Private Maritime Security Company
RECAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade

RUF	Rules for the Use of Force
SPM	Ship Protection Measures
SSA	Ship Security Assessment
SSAS	Ship Security Alert System
SSP	Ship Security Plan
TSS	Traffic Separation Scheme
UKMTO	United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations
VDR	Vessel Data Recorder
VHP	Vessel Hardening Plan
VMS	Vessel Monitoring System
VPD	Vessel Protection Detachment
VRA	Voluntary Reporting Area
WBIED	Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices

Supporting organisations

I.1   BMP5 Signatories

BIMCO

BIMCO is the world's largest international shipping association, with around 2,000 members in more than 120 countries, representing 56% of the world's tonnage. Our global membership includes shipowners, operators, managers, brokers and agents. A non-profit organisation, BIMCO's mission is to be at the forefront of global developments in shipping, providing expert knowledge and practical advice to safeguard and add value to members' businesses.

www.bimco.org

CDI

The Chemical Distribution Institute (CDI) was established in 1994 as a not for profit Foundation and provides ship and terminal inspection data in an electronic report format to its members. The main objectives of CDI is to continuously improve the safety and quality performance of chemical marine transportation and storage; Through cooperation with industry and centres of education, drive the development of industry best practice in marine transportation and storage of chemical products; To provide information and advice on industy best practice and international legislation for marine transportation and storage of chemical products; To provide chemical companies with cost effective systems for risk assessment, thus assisting their commitment to Responsible Care and the Code of Distribution Management Practice.

www.cdi.org.uk

CLIA

Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) is the world's largest cruise industry trade association, providing a unified voice and leading authority of the global cruise community. CLIA supports policies and practices that foster a safe, secure, healthy and sustainable cruise ship environment for the more than 25 million passengers who cruise annually and is dedicated to promote the cruise travel experience. The organization's mission is to be the unified global organization that helps its members succeed by advocating, educating and promoting for the common interests of the cruise community.

www.cruising.org

ICS International Chamber of Shipping

The **International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)** is the international trade association for merchant ship operators. ICS represents the collective views of the international industry from different nations, sectors and trades. ICS membership comprises national shipowners' associations representing over 80% of the world's merchant fleet. A major focus of ICS activity is the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations agency with responsibility for the safety of life at sea and the protection of the marine environment. ICS is heavily involved in a wide variety of areas including any technical, legal and operational matters affecting merchant ships. ICS is unique in that it represents the global interests of all the different trades in the industry: bulk carrier, tanker, container, and passenger ship operators

www.ics-shipping.org

IFSMA

The **International Federation of Shipmasters' Associations (IFSMA)** was formed in 1974 by Eight National Shipmasters' Associations to unite the World's serving Shipmasters into a single professional co-ordinated body. It is a non-profit making apolitical organisation dedicated solely to the interest of the serving Shipmaster. The Federation is formed of around 11,000 Shipmasters from sixty Countries either through their National Associations or as Individual Members. In 1975, IFSMA was granted Consultative Status as a non governmental organisation at IMO which enables the Federation to represent the views and protect the interests of the serving Shipmasters.

www.ifsma.org

IGP&I Clubs

Thirteen principal underwriting associations "the Clubs" comprise the **International Group of P&I Clubs (IGP&I)**. They provide liability cover (protection and indemnity) for approximately 90% of the world's ocean-going tonnage. The Clubs are mutual insurance associations providing cover for their members against third party liabilities relating to the use and operation of ships, including loss of life, pollution by oil and hazardous substances, wreck removal, collision and damage to property. Clubs also provide services to their members on claims handling, legal issues and loss prevention, and often play a leading role in coordinating the response to, and management of, maritime casualties.

www.igpandi.org

IMCA

The International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) is a leading trade association representing the vast majority of contractors and the associated supply chain in the offshore marine construction industry worldwide. We have a membership of 800 companies including contractors, suppliers, oil & gas companies, marine renewable energy companies and numerous non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

www.imca-int.com

INTERCARGO

The **International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO)**, established in 1980 in London and granted IMO NGO consultative status since 1993, is a voluntary non-profit association representing the interests of dry cargo vessel owners.

INTERCARGO provides the forum where quality dry bulk shipowners, managers and operators are informed about, discuss and share concerns on key topics and regulatory challenges, especially in relation to safety, the environment and operational excellence.

INTERCARGO promotes best practices and represents dry cargo shipping interests at IMO, other industry fora and the broader business context, basing its strategies on the principle of free and fair competition.

www.intercargo.org

InterManager

InterManager is the international trade association for the ship management industry established in 1991. It is the voice of ship management and the only organisation dedicated to representing the ship management and crew management industry. In today's global shipping industry InterManager works for the needs of like-minded companies in the ship and crew management sector, who all have the welfare of seafarers at their heats. InterManager acts as a forum to share best practices and bring about positive change. An internationally-recognised organisation, InterManager represents its members at international level, lobbying on their behalf to ensure their views are taken into account within the worldwide maritime industry.

www.intermanager.org

International Maritime Employers' Council Ltd (IMEC)

IMEC is the only international employers' organisation dedicated to maritime industrial relations. With offices in the UK and the Philippines, IMEC has a membership of over 235 shipowners and managers, covering some 8,000 ships with CBA's, which IMEC negotiates on behalf of its members within the International Bargaining Forum (IBF).

IMEC is also heavily involved in maritime training. The IMEC Enhanced cadet programme in the Philippines currently has over 700 young people under training.

www.imec.org.uk

International Transport Workers' Federation

The **International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF)** is an international trade union federation of transport workers' unions. Any independent trade union with members in the transport industry is eligible for membership of the ITF. The ITF has been helping seafarers since 1896 and today represents the interests of seafarers worldwide, of whom over 880,000 are members of ITF affiliated unions. The ITF is working to improve conditions for seafarers of all nationalities and to ensure adequate regulation of the shipping industry to protect the interests and rights of the workers. The ITF helps crews regardless of their nationality or the flag of their ship.

www.itfseafarers.org

www.itfglobal.org

INTERTANKO

INTERTANKO is the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, a forum where the industry meets, policies are discussed and best practices developed. INTERTANKO has been the voice of independent tanker owners since 1970, ensuring that the liquid energy that keeps the world turning is shipped safely, responsibly and competitively.

www.intertanko.com

IPTA

The **International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA)** was formed in 1987 to represent the interests of the specialised chemical/parcel tanker fleet and has since developed into an established representative body for ship owners operating IMO classified chemical/parcel tankers, being recognised as a focal point through which regulatory authorities and trade organisations may liaise with such owners. IPTA was granted consultative status as a Non-Governmental Organisation to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1997 and is wholly supportive of the IMO as the only body to introduce and monitor compliance with international maritime legislation.

www.ipta.org.uk

ISWAN

The **International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN)** is an international NGO and UK registered charity set up to promote the welfare of seafarers worldwide. We are a membership organisation with ship owners, unions and welfare organisation as members. We work with a range of bodies including PandI Clubs, shipping companies, ports, and governments. Our focus is the wellbeing of the 1.5 million seafarers around the world.

We support seafarers and their families who are affected by piracy and our 24 hour multilingual helpline, SeafarerHelp, is free for seafarers to call from anywhere in the world.

www.seafarerswelfare.org

Joint Hull Committee and Joint War Committee

The **Joint Hull and Joint War Committees** comprise elected underwriting representatives from both the Lloyd's and IUA company markets, representing the interests of those who write marine hull and war business in the London market.

Both sets of underwriters are impacted by piracy issues and support the mitigation of the exposures they face through the owners' use of BMP. The actions of owners and charterers will inform underwriters' approach to risk and coverage.

The Mission to Seafarers

The Mission to Seafarers is the largest provider of port-based welfare services, providing 200 port chaplains and 121 seafarers' centres across 50 countries. In addition to our services of free Wi-Fi, respite and transportation, all chaplains are trained in post-trauma counselling and are able to provide immediate support post attack or release, as well as connect with relevant professional services in a seafarer's home country. We run family support networks in the Philippines, Myanmar, Ukraine and India offering access to education, training and medical and legal services. The Mission to Seafarers is pleased to support the creation of BMP5 and the associated resources and commends their use to all maritime personnel.

www.missiontoseafarers.org

OCIMF

The **Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)** is a voluntary association of oil companies (the 'members') who have an interest in the shipment and terminalling of crude oil, oil products, petrochemicals and gas. OCIMF's mission is to be the foremost authority on the safe and environmentally responsible operation of oil tankers, terminals and offshore support vessels, promoting continuous improvement in standards of design and operation.

www.ocimf.org

Sailors' Society

Sailors' Society is the world's oldest maritime welfare organisation caring for seafarers and their families across the globe.

The charity works in ports across 30 countries and has projects ranging from medical centres to building boats to get children safely to school.

Our renowned Crisis Response Network helping victims of trauma at sea is run across Asia, Europe and Africa with plans to extend further.

Trained chaplains offer 24-hour support to victims of piracy, kidnapping and natural disasters and come alongside survivors and loved ones with psychological and financial help for as long as needed.

www.sailors-society.org

SIGTTO

The **Society for International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO)** is the international body established for the exchange of technical information and experience, between members of the industry, to enhance the safety and operational reliability of gas tankers and terminals.

To this end the Society publishes studies, and produces information papers and works of reference, for the guidance of industry members. It maintains working relationships with other industry bodies, governmental and intergovernmental agencies, including the International Maritime Organization, to better promote the safety and integrity of gas transportation and storage schemes.

www.sigtto.org

World Shipping Council

The **World Shipping Council (WSC)** is the trade association that represents the international liner shipping industry. WSC's member lines operate containerships, roll-on/roll-off vessels, and car carrier vessels that account for approximately 90 percent of the global liner vessel capacity. Collectively, these services transport about 60 percent of the value of global seaborne trade, or more than US$ 4 trillion worth of goods annually. WSC's goal is to provide a coordinated voice for the liner shipping industry in its work with policymakers and other industry groups to develop actionable solutions for some of the world's most challenging transportation problems. WSC serves as a non-governmental organization at the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

www.worldshipping.org

I.1   Naval/military/governmental organisations

 CGPCS

The **Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS)** was established on 14 January 2009, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1851. This ad hoc international forum brings together more than 60 countries, regional and international organisations, all working together towards the prevention of piracy off the coast of Somalia.

The CGPCS coordinates political, military and non-governmental efforts to combat piracy, ensures that pirates are brought to justice and support local governments to develop sustainable maritime security capabilities. The group's approach focuses on informality, inclusion and multi-stakeholder representation and is an attempt to find innovative solutions outside of formal international organisations.

 Combined Maritime Forces

Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) is an enduring global maritime partnership of 32 willing nations aligned in common purpose to conduct Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in order to provide security and stability in the maritime environment. CMF operates three Combined Task Forces (CTF) across the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin, Northern Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf. CTF150 is responsible for maritime security and counter-terrorism, CTF151 is responsible for deterring, disrupting and suppressing piracy and CTF152 is responsible for maritime security and counter-terrorism specifically in the Arabian Gulf. Visit **www.combinedmaritimeforces.com** or e-mail us at cmf_info@me.navy.mil.

EU NAVFOR

MSCHOA

Piracy and other maritime security issues have continued to be a threat to mariners who transit the Southern Rea Sea, Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean. The mission of the **European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR)** is (1) to PROTECT World Food Programme and other vulnerable shipping and (2) to deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. This requires (3) the enhancement of cooperation and coordination with an increasingly wide range of maritime actors to uphold freedom of navigation across a broad maritime security architecture. EU NAVFOR is also tasked with (4) monitoring fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. Thus, acting as a catalyst for action, EU NAVFOR continues to promote solutions to regional maritime security issues, thereby contributing to the EU's much wider security, capacity-building and capability-building work in this strategically important location.

The **Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)** is an integral part of EU NAVFOR, sitting functionally within the Operational Headquarters and staffed by military and civilian EU NAVFOR personnel. The MSCHOA provides a service to mariners in the Gulf of Aden, the Somali Basin and off the Horn of Africa. It is a Coordination Centre dedicated to safeguarding legitimate freedom of navigation in light of the risk of attack against merchant shipping in the region, in support of the UN Security Council's Resolutions (UNSCR) 1816 and subsequent reviews. EU NAVFOR and CMF are committed to ensuring that mariners have the most up to date regular threat assessments and incident specific bulletins, published by the MSCHOA. Through close dialogue with shipping companies, ships' masters and other interested parties, MSCHOA builds up a picture of vulnerable shipping in these waters and their approaches. The MSCHOA can then act as a focal point sharing information to provide support and protection to maritime traffic. There is a clear need to protect ships and their crews from illegitimate and dangerous attacks, safeguarding a key global trade route.

http://eunavfor.eu

www.mschoa.org

IMB Piracy Reporting Centre

Established in 1992, **IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC)** provides the shipping industry with a free 24-hour service to report any piracy or armed robbery incidents occurring anywhere in the world.

The IMB PRC is an independent and non-governmental agency aimed at raising awareness of areas at risk of these attacks. As a trusted point of contact for shipmasters reporting incidents to the IMB PRC from anywhere in the world, the IMB PRC immediately relays all incidents to the local law enforcement requesting assistance. Information is also immediately broadcast to all vessels via Inmarsat Safety Net to provide and increase awareness.

www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre

Information Fusion Centre

The **Information Fusion Centre (IFC)**, based in Singapore, serves as the regional Maritime Security (MARSEC) information-sharing hub. It has linkages with more than 70 regional and extra-regional Operational Centres (OPCENs) from navies and law enforcement agencies in 39 countries, as well as linkages with the shipping industry. It is also the only centre in the Asia-Pacific with International Liaison Officers (ILOs) from 16 countries.

The IFC collates and analyses relevant information to produce accurate, timely and actionable products, which enable its partners to respond to MARSEC incidents in good time. It also provides practical and useful information on MARSEC trends, incidents and best practices to the shipping industry. IFC also administers the Voluntary Community Reporting (VCR) for merchant vessels to report anomalies and incidents, enabling community contribution to Safe and Secure Seas for All.

INTERPOL

INTERPOL has a dedicated unit for maritime piracy that works with the police, navy and private sector in member countries, and can provide support to ship operators who have had their ships hijacked. INTERPOL's Maritime Security sub-Directorate (MTS) can be consulted on the recommended practices and action to be taken to help preserve the integrity of any evidence left behind following a pirate attack that could be useful to law enforcement agents pursuing an investigation.

MTS can be contacted on tel +33 472 44 72 33 or via email dlMTSOPSupport@interpol.int during business hours (GMT 08H00 – 17H00).

Outside of normal business hours, contact can be made via INTERPOL's Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC). The CCC is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and supports INTERPOL's 190 member countries faced with a crisis situation or requiring urgent operational assistance. The CCC operates in all four of Interpol's official languages (English, French, Spanish and Arabic). Contact details are: tel +33 472 44 7676; email os-ccc@interpol.int.

It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL within 3 days of a hijacking of their ship.

NCAGS

The **Naval Cooperation & Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS)** mission is to facilitate the exchange of information between the United States Navy, Combined Maritime Forces, and the commercial maritime community in the United States Central Command's (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility. NCAGS operates as a conduit for information focused on the safety and security of shipping and is committed to assisting all members of the commercial maritime community. To help combat piracy, NCAGS serves as a secondary emergency point of contact for mariners in distress (after UKMTO) and also disseminates transit guidance to the maritime industry. NCAGS disseminates guidance to merchant shippers via briefings, website, email, and duty phone concerning Naval Exercises, Boardings, Aids to Navigation, Environmental Issues, MEDEVAC Assistance, Security and Augments, Regional Search and Rescue Centres.

UKMTO

UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKTMO) capability acts as the primary point of contact for merchant vessels and liaison with military forces within the region. UKTMO also administers the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, under which merchant vessels are encouraged to send regular reports, providing their position/speed and ETA at the next port of call, in accordance with the Maritime Security Chart Q6099.

Emerging and time relevant information impacting commercial traffic can then be passed directly to vessels at sea, and responding assets accordingly, therefore improving the collective responsiveness to an incident. For further information on UKMTO please contact:

Emergency Telephone Numbers: +44 (0)2392 222060 or +971 5055 23215

e-mail: watchkeepers@ukmto.org   Web: **www.ukmto.org**

Voyage reference card

Understand the threat

- Get threat information.
- Review guidance.
- Review Rules for the Use of Force.

Assess the risk

- Conduct risk assessment.
- Identify ship protection measures.

Protect the ship and crew

- Harden the ship.
- Test critical equipment.
- Brief/train the crew.
- Extra lookout/radar watch.
- Control access.
- Follow military advice.

Do NOT be alone

- Report to UKMTO.
- Register with MSCHOA.
- Report suspicious activity.
- Report incidents.
- Send DISTRESS if attacked.

UKMTO
+44 (0) 2392 222060
watchkeepers@ukmto.org

MSCHOA
+44 1923 958545
www.mschoa.org

Cooperate with:

- Other shipping and military forces.
- Local law enforcement.
- Welfare providers.

Primary layer of defence

- Good lookout/vigilance.
- Razor wire.
- Manoeuvring.
- Speed/freeboard.
- PCASP.

Secondary layer of defence

- Door hardening.
- Gate/grate.
- Motion sensor/CCTV.

Last layer of defence

- Internal door hardening.
- Citadel/safe muster point.
- Communication.

BMP5

Detect, Deter, Delay

Do Not Be BOARDED

Do Not Be VULNERABLE

Do Not Be SURPRISED